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Abstract. We introduce a general approach based on selective verification and obtain approximate mechanisms
without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Having a good allo-
cation in mind, a mechanism with verification selects few critical agents and detects, using a verification oracle,
whether they have reported truthfully. If yes, the mechanism produces the desired allocation. Otherwise, the mech-
anism ignores any misreports and proceeds with the remaining agents. We obtain randomized truthful (or almost
truthful) mechanisms without money that verify only O(lnm/ε) agents, where m is the number of outcomes, inde-
pendently of the total number of agents, and are (1− ε)-approximate for the social welfare. We also show that any
truthful mechanism with a constant approximation ratio needs to verify Ω(logm) agents. A remarkable property
of our mechanisms is robustness, namely that their outcome depends only on the reports of the truthful agents.
1 Introduction
Let us start with a simple mechanism design setting where we place a facility on the line based on the
preferred locations of n strategic agents. Each agent aims to minimize the distance of her preferred location
to the facility and may misreport her location, if it finds it profitable. Our objective is to minimize the
maximum distance of any agent to the facility and we insist that the facility allocation should be truthful, i.e.,
no agent can improve her distance by misreporting her location. The optimal solution is to place the facility
at the average of the two extreme locations. However, if we cannot incentivize truthfulness through monetary
transfers (e.g., due to ethical or practical reasons, see also [27]), the optimal solution is not truthful. E.g., the
leftmost agent has an incentive to declare a location further on the left so that the facility moves closer to her
preferred location. In fact, for the infinite real line, the optimal solution leads to no equilibrium declarations
for the leftmost and the rightmost agent. The fact that in this simple setting, the optimal solution is not
truthful was part of the motivation for the research agenda of approximate mechanism design without money,
introduced by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27]. They proved that the best deterministic (resp. randomized)
truthful mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of 2 (resp. 3/2) for this problem.
Our work is motivated by the simple observation that the optimal facility allocation can be implemented
truthfully if we inspect the declared locations of the two extreme agents and verify that they coincide with
their preferred locations (e.g., for their home address, we may mail something there, visit them or ask for a
certificate). Inspection of the two extreme locations takes place before we place the facility. If both agents are
truthful, we place the facility at their average. Otherwise, we ignore any false declarations and recurse on the
remaining agents. This simple modification of the optimal solution is truthful, because non-extreme agents
do not affect the facility allocation, while the two extreme agents cannot change the facility location in their
favor, due to the verification step. Interestingly, the Greedy algorithm for k-Facility Location (see e.g., [30,
Sec. 2.2]) also becomes truthful if we verify the k agents allocated a facility and ignore any liars among
them (see Section 4). Greedy is 2-approximate for minimizing the maximum agent-facility distance, in any
metric space, while [14] shows that there are no deterministic truthful mechanisms (without verification)
that place k ≥ 2 facilities in tree metrics and achieve a bounded (in terms of n and k) approximation ratio.
Selective Verification: Motivation and Justification. Verifying the declarations of most (or all) agents and
imposing large penalties on liars should suffice for the truthful implementation of socially efficient solutions
(see e.g., [6]). But in the facility location examples above, we truthfully implement the optimal (or an almost
optimal) solution by verifying a very small number of agents (independent of n) and by using a mild and
reasonable penalty. Apparently, verification is successful in these examples because it is selective, in the
sense that we verify only the critical agents for the facility allocation and fully trust the remaining agents.
Motivated by this observation, we investigate the power of selective verification in approximate mech-
anism design without money in general domains. We consider the general setting of utilitarian voting with
m outcomes and n strategic agents, where each agent has a nonnegative utility for each outcome. We aim
at truthful mechanisms that verify few critical agents and approximate the maximum social welfare, i.e., the
total utility of the agents for the selected outcome. Our goal is to determine the best approximation guarantee
achievable by such mechanisms with limited selective verification, so that we obtain a better understand-
ing of the power of limited verification in mechanism design without money. Our main result is a smooth
and essentially best possible tradeoff between the approximation ratio and the number of agents verified by
randomized truthful (or almost truthful) mechanisms with selective verification.
Our general approach is to start from a (non-truthful) allocation rule f with a good approximation guar-
antee for the social welfare and to devise a mechanism F without money that incentivizes truthful reporting
by selective verification. The mechanism F first selects an outcome o and an (ideally small) verification set
of agents according to f (e.g., for facility location on the line, the allocation rule f is to take the average of
the two extreme locations, the selected outcome o is the average for the particular instance and the verifica-
tion set consists of the two extreme agents). Next, F detects, through the use of a verification oracle, whether
the selected agents are truthful. If yes, the mechanism outputs o. Otherwise, F excludes any misreporting
agents and continues with the remaining agents. We note that F asks the verification oracle for a single bit of
information about each agent verified: whether she has reported truthfully or not. F excludes misreporting
agents from the allocation rule, so it does not need to know anything else about their true utilities.
Instead of imposing some explicit (i.e., monetary) penalty to the agents caught lying by verification,
the mechanism F just ignores their reports, a reasonable reaction to their revealed attempt of manipulating
the mechanism. We underline that liars still get utility from the selected outcome. It just happens that their
preferences are not taken into account in the allocation. For these reasons, the penalty of exclusion from the
mechanism is mild and compatible with the spirit of mechanisms without money.
Selective verification allows for an explicit quantification of the amount of verification and is applicable
to essentially any domain. From a theoretical viewpoint, we believe that it can lead to a deep and delicate
understanding of the power of limited verification in approximate mechanism design without money. From
a practical viewpoint, the extent to which selective verification and the penalty of ignoring false declarations
are natural very much depends on the particular domain / application. E.g., for applications of facility loca-
tion, where utility is usually determined by the home address of each agent, public authorities have simple
ways of verifying it. E.g., registration to a public service usually requires a certificate of address. Failure to
provide such a certificate usually implies that the application is ignored, with no penalties attached.
Technical Approach and Results. A (randomized) mechanism with selective verification is truthful (in
expectation) if no matter the reports of the other agents and whether they are truthful or not, truthful reporting
maximizes the (expected) utility of each agent from the mechanism. Two nice features of our allocation
rules (and mechanisms) is that they are strongly anonymous and scale invariant. The former means that the
allocation only depends on the total agents’ utility for each outcome (and not on each agent’s contribution)
and the latter means that multiplying all valuations by a positive factor does not change the allocation.
For mechanisms with selective verification, truthfulness is an immediate consequence of two natural
(and desirable) properties: robustness and voluntary participation. Robustness is a strong property made
possible by selective verification. A mechanism with verification F is robust if F completely ignores any
misreports and the resulting probability distribution is determined by the reports of truthful agents only. So,
if F is robust, no misreporting agent can change the resulting allocation whatsoever. We achieve robustness
through obliviousness of F to the declarations of misreporting agents not verified (see also [13, Sec. 5]).
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Specifically, a randomized mechanism F is oblivious if the probability distribution of F over the outcomes,
conditional on the event that no misreporting agents are included in the verification set, is identical to the
probability distribution of F if all misreporting agents are excluded from the mechanism. By induction on
the number of agents, we show that obliviousness is a sufficient condition for robustness (Lemma 3.1). To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that robustness (or a similar) property is considered in mechanism
design. We defer the discussion about robustness and its comparison to truthfulness to Section A.2.
Robustness leaves each agent with essentially two strategies: either she reports truthfully and participates
in the mechanism or she lies and is excluded from the mechanism. An allocation rule satisfies voluntary
participation (or simply, participation ) if each agent’s utility when she is truthful is no less than her utility
when she is excluded from the mechanism. Robustness and participation immediately imply truthfulness1
(Lemma 3.2). We prove that strongly anonymous randomized allocation rules that satisfy participation are
closely related to maximal in distributional range rules (see e.g., [9,21]), i.e., allocation rules that maximize
the expected social welfare over a (not necessarily proper) subset of probability distributions over outcomes.
Specifically, we show that maximizing the social welfare is sufficient for participation (Lemma 2.1), while
for scale invariant and continuous allocation rules, it is also necessary (Lemma 2.2).
As a proof of concept, we apply selective verification to k-Facility Location problems (Section 4), which
have served as benchmarks in approximate mechanism design without money (see e.g., [27,1,22,12] and the
references therein). We show that Greedy ([30, Section 2.2]) and Proportional [22] satisfy participation and
are robust and truthful, if we verify the k agents allocated the facilities (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2).
For the general setting of utilitarian voting, we aim at strongly anonymous randomized allocation rules
that are maximal in distributional range, so that they satisfy participation, and oblivious, so that they achieve
robustness. In Section 5, we present the Power mechanism, which selects each outcome o with probability
proportional to the ℓ-th power of the total utility for o, where ℓ ≥ 0 is a parameter. Intuitively, Power provides
a smooth transition from the (robust and truthful) uniform allocation, where each outcome is selected with
probability 1/m, for ℓ = 0, to the optimal solution, for ℓ→∞. Power approximately maximizes the social
welfare and approximately satisfies participation. It is also scale invariant and, due to the proportional nature
of its probability distribution, is oblivious and robust. Power can be implemented with selective verification
of at most ℓ agents. Using ℓ = lnm/ε, we obtain that for any ε > 0, Power with selective verification of
lnm/ε agents, is robust, ε-truthful and (1− ε)-approximate for the social welfare (Theorem 5.1).
To quantify the improvement, we show that without verification, in the general setting of utilitarian vot-
ing, the best possible approximation ratio of any randomized truthful mechanism is 1/m (see Section A.11).
In a slightly more restricted setting with injective valuations [10], the best known randomized truthful mech-
anism has an approximation ratio of Θ(m−3/4) and the best possible approximation ratio is O(m−2/3).
Moreover, the amount of verification is essentially best possible, since we prove that any truthful mechanism
with constant approximation ratio needs to verify Ω(logm) agents (Theorem 6.1). We essentially match this
lower bound, that applies to all mechanisms, by strongly anonymous and scale invariant mechanisms.
In Section 7, we characterize the class of scale invariant and strongly anonymous truthful mechanisms
that verify o(n) agents and achieve full allocation, i.e., they result in some outcome with probability 1.
We prove that any such mechanism must employ a constant allocation rule, i.e., a probability distribution
that does not depend on the agent declarations. Therefore, such mechanisms cannot achieve nontrivial ap-
proximation guarantees. Our characterization reveals an interesting and deep connection between continuity
(which is necessary for low verification), full allocation, and maximal in distributional range mechanisms.
Relaxing some of the properties in the characterization, we can obtain (fully) truthful mechanisms with
low verification. Relaxing full allocation, we obtain the Partial Power mechanism (Section 8), and relaxing
scale invariance, we obtain the Exponential mechanism (Section 9). Both are truthful, robust. For any ε > 0,
1 The reader is invited to verify that the average mechanism for facility location on the line is scale invariant, not strongly anony-
mous, oblivious (and thus, robust) and satisfies participation. Robustness and participation imply that the mechanism is truthful.
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Power Partial Power Exponential
ε-truthful truthful truthful
full allocation partial allocation full allocation
scale invariant scale invariant not scale invariant
robust robust robust
(1 − ε)-approximation (1− ε)-approximation additive error εn
verification lnm/ε verification O(lnm/ε2) expected verification lnm/ε
Fig. 1. The main properties of our mechanisms. Partial allocation means that the mechanism may result in an artificial outcome of
valuation 0 for all agents (e.g., we may refuse to allocate anything, for private goods, or to setup the service, for public goods). We
depict in bold the property whose relaxation allows the mechanism to escape the characterization of Theorem 7.1.
they verify O(lnm/ε2) agents in the worst-case and lnm/ε agents in expectation, respectively. Partial
Power is (1− ε)-approximate, while Exponential has an additive error of εn. For Exponential, we can have
an approximation ratio of 1− ε, given a constant factor estimation of the value maximum social welfare. All
the mechanisms can be implemented in polynomial or expected polynomial time in n and m.
The properties of our mechanisms are summarized in Fig. 1. In all cases, we achieve a smooth tradeoff
between the number of agents verified and the quality of approximation. Rather surprisingly, the verification
depends on m, the number of outcomes, but not on n, the number n of agents. Also, we discuss (Section A.3)
an application to the Combinatorial Public Project problem (see e.g., [28,24]).
Related Work. Due to lack of space, we restrict our attention to the most relevant previous work (see
also Section A.1). Previous work [2,6,15] demonstrated that partial verification is essentially useless in the
design of truthful mechanisms. Therefore, verification should be exact, i.e., it should forbid even negligible
deviations from the truth, at least for some types of misreports. Thus, recent research has focused on the
power of exact verification schemes that use either limited or costly verification and mild penalties.
In this direction, [6] introduces probabilistic verification as a general framework for the use of verifi-
cation in mechanism design. They show that almost any allocation rule can be implemented whit a truthful
mechanism with money and probabilistic verification, provided that (i) the detection probability is positive
for all agents and for negligible deviations from the truth; and that (ii) each liar incurs a sufficiently large
penalty. Here, we instead use selective verification and the reasonable penalty of ignoring misreports and
we verify only a small subset of agents instead of almost all of them.
Our approach of selective verification is conceptually similar to the setting of [5], which considers truth-
ful allocation of an indivisible good without money and with costly selective verification and seeks to maxi-
mize the social welfare minus the verification cost. Nevertheless, our setting and our mechanisms are much
more general, we resort to approximate mechanisms (rather than exact ones) and treat the verification cost
as a different efficiency criterion (instead of incorporating it in the social objective). Moreover, selective ver-
ification bears some resemblance to [17], which considers truthful mechanisms with money for single-unit
and multi-unit auctions and aims at a good tradeoff between the social welfare and the payments charged.
There is a significant amount of work on mechanism design with verification where either the structure
of the optimal mechanism is characterized (see e.g., [29]), or mechanisms with money and verification are
shown to achieve better approximation guarantees than mechanisms without verification (see e.g., [4,20]). To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first where truthful mechanisms with limited selective verification
(instead of partial or “one-sided” verification applied to all agents with positive utility) are shown to achieve
best possible approximation guarantees for the general domain of utilitarian voting.
From a technical viewpoint, the idea of partial allocation in approximate mechanism design without
money has been employed with remarkable success in [7]. However, this technique can achieve very re-
stricted results in maximizing social welfare without verification in a very general setting as utilitarian
voting (see Section A.11). Moreover, our motivation for using the exponential mechanism with selective
verification came from [23,18], due their tradeoffs between the approximation guarantee and the probability
of the gap mechanism (resp. amount of payments) required for truthfulness.
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
For any integer m ≥ 1, we let [m] ≡ {1, . . . ,m}. For an event E, Pr[E] denotes the probability of E. For
a random variable X, E[X] denotes the expectation of X. For a finite set S, ∆(S) is the unit simplex over
S, which includes all probability distributions over S. For a vector x = (x1, . . . , xm) and some j ∈ [m],
x−j is x without xj . For a nonempty S ⊆ [m], xS = (xj)j∈S is the projection of x to S. For vectors x
and y, x + y = (x1 + y1, . . . , xm + ym) denotes their coordinate-wise sum. For a vector x and an ℓ ≥ 0,
xℓ = (xℓ1, . . . , x
ℓ
m) is the coordinate-wise power of x and ‖x‖ℓ = (
∑m
j=1 x
ℓ
j)
1/ℓ is the ℓ-norm of x. For
convenience, we let ‖x‖1 = |x|. Moreover, ‖x‖∞ = maxj∈[m]{xj} is the infinity norm of x.
Agent Valuations. We consider a set N of n strategic agents with private preferences over a set O of
outcomes. We focus on combinatorial problems, assume that O is finite and let m ≡ |O| be the number of
different outcomes. The preferences of each agent i are given by a valuation function or type xi : O → R≥0
that i seeks to maximize. The set of possible valuations is the domain D = Rm≥0. We usually regard each
valuation as a vector xi = (xi(j))j∈[m], where xi(j) is i’s valuation for outcome j. A valuation profile
is a tuple x = (x1, . . . ,xn) consisting of the agents’ valuations. Given a valuation profile x, w(x) =
x1 + · · · + xn is the vector of the total valuation, or simply, of the weight, for each outcome. We usually
write w, instead of w(x), when x is clear from the context.
Allocation Rules. A (randomized) allocation rule f : Dn → ∆(O) maps each valuation profile to a
probability distribution over O. To allow for exclusion of some agents from f , we always assume that f is
well defined for any number of agents n′, 0 ≤ n′ ≤ n. We regard the probability distribution of f on input
x as a vector f(x) = (fj(x))j∈[m], where fj(x) is the probability of outcome j. Then, the expected utility
of agent i from f(x) is equal to the dot product xi · f(x). An allocation rule is constant if for all valuation
profiles x and y, f(x) = f(y), i.e., the probability distribution of f in independent of the valuation profile.
E.g., the uniform allocation rule, that selects each outcome with probability 1/m, is constant.
A rule f achieves full allocation if for all x, |f(x)| = 1, and partial allocation if |f(x)| < 1, for some
x. A full allocation rule always outputs an outcome o ∈ O, while a partial allocation rule may also output
an artificial (or null) outcome not in O. We assume that all agents have valuation 0 for the null outcome.
Two nice properties of our allocation rules is that they are strongly anonymous and (most of them)
scale invariant. An allocation rule f is scale invariant if for any valuation profile x and any α ∈ R>0,
f(αx) = f(x), i.e., scaling all valuations in x by α does not change the allocation. An allocation rule f
is strongly anonymous if f(x) depends only on the vector w(x) with outcome weights. Formally, for all
valuation profiles x and y (possibly with a different number of agents) with w(x) = w(y), f(x) = f(y).
Hence, a strongly anonymous rule can be regarded as a one-agent allocation rule f : D → ∆(O).
Approximation Guarantee. The social efficiency of an allocation rule f is evaluated by a social objective
function g : Dn×O → R≥0. We mostly consider the objective of social welfare, where we seek to maximize∑n
i=1 xi ·f(x). The optimal social welfare of a valuation profile x is ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖∞ . An allocation rule f has
approximation ratio ρ ∈ (0, 1] (resp. additive error δ > 0) if for all valuation profiles x, ∑ni=1 xi · f(x) ≥
ρ ‖∑ni=1 xi‖∞ (resp. ∑ni=1 xi · f(x) ≥ ‖∑ni=1 xi‖∞ − δ ).
Voluntary Participation and MIDR. An allocation rule f satisfies voluntary participation (or simply,
participation) if for any agent i and any valuation profile x, xi · f(x) ≥ xi · f(x−i), i.e., i’s utility does
not decrease if she participates in the mechanism. For some ǫ ∈ (0, 1], f satisfies ǫ-participation if for all
agents i and valuation profiles x, xi ·f(x) ≥ ǫxi ·f(x−i). An allocation rule f is maximal in distributional
range (MIDR) if there exist a range Z of (possibly partial) allocations and a function h : Z → R such that
for all valuation profiles x, f(x) = argmaxz∈Z
∑n
i=1 xi · z + h(z) (see e.g., [9,21]). The following show
that MIDR is a sufficient condition for participation and that for scale invariant and strongly anonymous
continuous allocations, MIDR is also necessary (the proofs can be found in Section A.4 and Section A.5).
Lemma 2.1. Let f be any MIDR allocation rule. Then, f satisfies participation.
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Lemma 2.2. For any scale invariant and strongly anonymous continuous allocation rule f that satisfies
participation, there is a range Z of (possibly partial) allocations such that f(x) = argmaxz∈Z x · z.
3 Mechanisms with Selective Verification and Basic Properties
A mechanism with selective verification F takes as input a reported valuation profile y and has oracle access
to a binary verification vector s ∈ {0, 1}n, with si = 1 if agent i has truthfully reported yi = xi, and si = 0
otherwise. In fact, we assume that F verifies an agent i through a verification oracle ver that on input i,
returns ver(i) = si. So, we regard a mechanism with verification as a function F : Dn × {0, 1}n → ∆(O).
We highlight that although the entire vector s appears as a parameter of F , for notational convenience, the
outcome of F actually depends on few selected coordinates of s. We denote V (y) ⊆ N , or simply V , the
set of agents verified by F on input y. As for allocation rules, we treat the probability distribution of F over
outcomes as an m-dimensional vector and assume that F is well defined for any number of agents n′ ≤ n.
Our approach is to start from an allocation rule f and to devise a mechanism F that motivates truthful
reporting by selective verification. We say that a mechanism F with selective verification is recursive if
there is an allocation rule f such that F operates as follows: on a valuation profile y, F selects an outcome
o, with probability fo(y), and a verification set V (y), and computes the set L = {i ∈ V (y) : ver(i) = 0}
of misreporting agents in V (y). If L = ∅, F returns o. Otherwise, F recurses on y−L. Our mechanisms are
recursive, except for Partial Power (Section 8), which adopts a slightly different reaction to L 6= ∅.
Given an allocation rule f , we say that a mechanism with verification F is an extension of f is for
all valuation profiles x, F (x,1) = f(x). Namely, F behaves exactly as f given that all agents report
truthfully. For the converse, given a mechanism F , we say that F induces an allocation rule f if for all x,
f(x) = F (x,1). For clarity, we refer to mechanisms with selective verification simply as mechanisms, and
denote them by uppercase letters, and to allocation rules simply as rules or algorithms, and denote them by
lowercase letters. A mechanism F has a property of an allocation rule (e.g., scale invariance, partial or full
allocation, participation, approximation ratio) iff the induced rule f has this property.
A mechanism F is ǫ-truthful, for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1], if for any agent i, for any valuation pair xi and yi and
for all reported valuations y−i and verification vectors s−i,
xi · F ((y−i,xi), (s−i, 1)) ≥ ǫxi · F ((y−i,yi), (s−i, 0))
A mechanism F is truthful if it is 1-truthful. Namely, no matter the reported valuations of the other agents
and whether they report truthfully or not, the expected utility of agent i is maximized if she reports truthfully.
Robustness and Obliviousness. A remarkable property of our mechanisms is robustness, namely that they
ignore the valuations of misreporting agents and let their outcome be determined by the valuations of truthful
agents only. Formally, a mechanism F is robust if for all reported valuations y and verification vectors
s, F (y, s) = F (yT (s), (1, . . . 1)), with the equality referring to the probability distribution of F , where
T (s) = {i ∈ N : si = 1} is the set of truthful agents. Next, we simply use T , instead of T (s).
A mechanism with selective verification F is oblivious (to the declarations of misreporting agents not
verified) if for all valuation profiles y and verification vectors s, with L = N \ T (s), and any outcome o,
Pr[F (y, s) = o |V (y) ∩ L = ∅] = Pr[F (y−L,1) = o] (1)
I.e., if the misreporting agents are not caught, they do not affect the probability distribution of F (see also
[13]). By induction on the number of misreports, we show that obliviousness is sufficient for robustness.
Lemma 3.1. Let F be any oblivious recursive mechanism with selective verification. Then, F is robust.
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Proof. We fix a valuation profile y and a verification vector s, and prove that for any outcome o ∈ O,
Pr[F (y, s) = o] = Pr[F (yT ,1) = o], where T ⊆ N is the set of truthful agents in y. Clearly, this implies
that F is robust. The proof is by induction on the number of agents N .
If N = ∅, the statement is obvious. So, we assume inductively that the statement holds for every proper
subset of N . Let L = N \ T be the set of misreporting agents in y and let V be the verification set of F on
input y. Then,
Pr[F (y, s) = o] =
∑
L′⊆L
Pr[F (y, s) = o |V ∩ L = L′]Pr[V ∩ L = L′] (2)
We have that Pr[F (y, s) = o |V ∩L = ∅] = Pr[F (yT ,1) = o], by (1), since F is oblivious. If V includes a
non-empty set L′ = V ∩L, since F is recursive, it ignores their declarations and recurses on y−L′ . Therefore,
for all ∅ 6= L′ ⊆ L, Pr[F (y, s) = o |V ∩ L = L′] = Pr[F (y−L′ , s−L′) = o] = Pr[F (yT ,1) = o] , where
the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis, because the agents in y−L′ are a proper subset of
agents in y. Therefore, using that Pr[F (y, s) = o |V ∩L = L′] = Pr[F (yT ,1) = o], for all L′ ⊆ L, in (2),
we obtain that Pr[F (y, s) = o] = Pr[F (yT ,1) = o], i.e., that F is robust. ⊓⊔
Robustness, Participation and Truthfulness. In the Appendix, Section A.6, we show that robustness and
participation imply truthfulness (note that the converse may not be true, since a truthful mechanism with
verification does not need to be robust). Then, by Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 3.1, we can focus on MIDR
allocation rules for which the outcome and the verification set can be selected in an oblivious way.
Lemma 3.2. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1], if a mechanism with selective verification F is robust and satisfies ǫ-
participation, then F is ǫ-truthful.
Quantifying Verification. Focusing on truthful mechanisms with verification, where the agents do not have
any incentive to misreport, we bound the amount of verification when the agents are truthful (similarly to the
definition of the approximation ratio of F as the approximation ratio of the induced allocation rule f ). For a
truthful mechanism F , this is exactly the amount of verification required so that F motivates truthfulness.
Given a mechanism with verification F , its worst-case verification is Ver(F ) ≡ maxx∈Dn |V (x)|,
i.e., the maximum number of agents verified by F in any truthful valuation profile. If F is randomized, its
expected verification is EVer(F ) ≡ maxx∈Dn E[|V (x)|], where expectation is over all random strings used.
4 Motivating Example: Facility Location Mechanisms with Selective Verification
As a proof of concept, we apply mechanisms with verification to k-Facility Location. In such problems, we
have a metric space (M,d), where M is a finite set of points and d is a metric distance function. The out-
comes are all subsets of k locations in M . Each agent i has a preferred location ti ∈M and her “valuation”
for outcome C is xi(C) = −d(ti, C), i.e., minus the distance of her preferred location to the nearest facility
in C . So, each agent i aims at minimizing d(ti, C). The mechanism F gets a profile z = (z1, . . . , zn) of
reported locations. Using access to a verification oracle, F maps z to a set C of k facility locations.
Maximum Cost. To minimize maxi∈N{d(ti, F (t,1))}, i.e, the maximum agent-facility distance, we use
the 2-approximate Greedy algorithm for k-Center (see e.g., [30, Sec. 2.2]). On input z, Greedy first allocates
a facility to an arbitrary agent. As long as |C| < k, the next facility is allocated to the agent i maximizing
d(zi, C). We extend Greedy to a mechanism with selective verification by inspecting the reported location
zi of every agent i allocated a facility. If all of them are truthful, we place the k facilities at C . Otherwise,
we exclude any liars in C and recurse on the remaining agents. In the Appendix, Section A.7, we establish
the properties of Greedy with verification. To quantify the improvement due to the use of verification, we
highlight that there are no deterministic truthful mechanisms (without verification) that place k ≥ 2 facilities
in tree metrics and achieve a bounded (in terms of n and k) approximation ratio (see [14]).
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Mechanism 1 The Power Mechanism Powℓ(x, s)
let N be the set of the remaining agents and let L← ∅
pick an outcome j ∈ O and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ
with probability proportional to the value of the term xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j)
for each agent i ∈ t do
if ver(i) 6= 1 then L← L ∪ {i}
if L 6= ∅ then return Powℓ(x−L, s−L)
else return outcome j
Theorem 4.1. The Greedy mechanism with verification for k-Facility Location is truthful and robust, is
2-approximate for the maximum cost and verifies k agents.
Social Cost. To minimize
∑n
i=1 d(ti, F (t,1)), i.e, the total cost of the agents, we use the Proportional
mechanism [22], which is Θ(ln k)-approximate [3]. Proportional first allocates a facility to an agent chosen
uniformly at random. As long as |C| < k, agent i is allocated the next facility with probability proportional to
d(zi, C). Verifying the reported location of every agent allocated a facility, we obtain that (see Section A.8):
Theorem 4.2. The Proportional mechanism with verification for k-Facility Location is truthful and robust,
is Θ(ln k)-approximate for the social cost and verifies k agents.
5 The Power Mechanism with Selective Verification
In this section, we present the Power mechanism, a recursive mechanism with verification that approximates
the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Power with parameter ℓ ≥ 0 (or Powℓ, for
brevity, see also Mechanism 1) is based on a strongly anonymous and scale invariant allocation that assigns
probability proportional to the weight of each outcome raised to ℓ. Hence, for each valuation profile x, the
outcome of Powℓ depends on the weight vector w =
∑n
i=1 xi. If all agents are truthful, Pow
ℓ results in
each outcome j with probability wℓj/
∑m
q=1w
ℓ
q, i.e., proportional to wℓj (note that for ℓ = 0, we get the
uniform allocation, while for ℓ = ∞, the outcome of maximum weight gets probability 1). To implement
this allocation with low verification, we observe that each term wℓj can be expanded in nℓ terms as follows2:
wℓj =
(∑
i∈N
xi(j)
)ℓ
=
∑
t∈Nℓ
xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j) (3)
Hence, choosing an outcome j and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ with probability proportional3 to xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j),
we end up with each outcome j with probability proportional to wℓj . The verification set of Powℓ consists
of the agents in t. Since at most ℓ agents contribute to each term xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j), we can make Powℓ
robust and almost truthful by verifying at most ℓ agents. In Section A.9, we show that Powℓ is oblivious,
due to its proportional nature, and thus robust, and satisfies m−1/(ℓ+1)-participation. Thus, we obtain that:
Theorem 5.1. For any ε > 0, Powℓ with ℓ = lnm/ε is robust and (1 − ε)-truthful, has worst-case verifi-
cation lnm/ε, and achieves an approximation ratio of (1− ε) for the social welfare.
2 For example, let n = 3, ℓ = 2 and wj = x1 +x2+x3 (we omit j from x’s for clarity). In (3), we expand w2j in 32 = 9 terms as
follows w2j = (x1+x2+x3)2 = x1x1+x1x2+x1x3+x2x1+x2x2+x2x2+x3x1+x3x2+x3x3. Hence, in this example,
t ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}. Given that outcome j is chosen, each of these terms (and the corresponding tuple t) is selected with
probability proportional to its value. E.g., x1x2 and t = (1, 2) are selected with probability x1x2/w2j .
3 To sample from (3) inO(m+nℓ) steps, we select outcome j with probabilitywℓj/|wℓ|, and then, conditional on j, we select agent
i in each position of t independently with probability xi(j)/wj . Each tuple t is picked with probability xt1(j) · · ·xtℓ(j)/|w
ℓ|.
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6 Logarithmic Verification is Best Possible
Next, we describe a random family of instances where truthfulness requires a logarithmic expected verifica-
tion. Below, we only sketch the main idea of the proof. The full proof can be found in Section A.10.
Theorem 6.1. Let F be randomized truthful mechanism that achieves a constant approximation ratio for
any number of agents n and any number of outcomes F . Then, F needs expected verification Ω(logm).
Proof sketch. We consider m outcomes and m disjoint groups of agents. Each group has a large number ν
of agents. An agent in group j has valuation 0 for any other outcome and valuation either 1 or δ for outcome
j, where δ > 0 is tiny (e.g., δ = 1/ν10). In each group j, the probability that k agents, 0 ≤ k ≤ ν, have
valuation 1 for outcome j is 2−(k+1). The expected maximum social welfare of such instances is Θ(logm).
We next focus on a group j of agents and fix x−j , i.e., the declarations of the agents in all other groups.
Using a simple argument, we can assume wlog. that the probability of outcome j depends only on the
number of agents in group j that declare 1 for j. Thus, the mechanism induces a sequence of probabilities
p0, p1, . . . , pk, · · · , where pk is the probability of outcome j, given that the number of agents that declare 1
for j is k. Since the mechanism is truthful, if k agents declare 1 for outcome j, we need to verify each of
them with probability at least pk−pk−1. Otherwise, an agent with valuation δ can declare 1 and improve her
expected utility. Therefore, for any fixed x−j , when k agents declare 1 for outcome j, we need an expected
verification of at least k(pk − pk−1) for agents in group j.
Assuming truthful reporting and taking the expectation over the number of agents in group j with valu-
ation 1, we find that expected verification for agents in group j is at least half the expected social welfare of
the mechanism from group j, conditional on x−j , minus half the probability of outcome j, conditional on
x−j . Removing the conditioning on x−j and summing up over all groups j, we find that expected verifica-
tion is at least half the expected welfare of the mechanism minus 1/2. Since the mechanism has a constant
approximation ratio, there are instances where the expected verification is Ω(logm). ⊓⊔
7 Characterization of Strongly Anonymous Mechanisms
Next, we characterize the class of scale invariant and strongly anonymous truthful mechanisms that verify
o(n) agents. The characterization is technically involved and consists of four main steps. We first prove that
these rules are continuous (for full proof see Section A.12).
Lemma 7.1. Let f be any scale invariant and strongly anonymous allocation rule. If f is discontinuous,
every truthful extension F of f needs to verify Ω(n) agents in expectation, for arbitrarily large n.
Proof sketch. First, we prove that if f has a discontinuity, there are Ω(n) agents that have a very small
valuation δ > 0 and can change the allocation by a constant factor, independent of n and δ. Next, we focus
on any truthful extension F of f and show that for every agent i that has the ability to change the allocation
by a constant factor, the probability that F verifies i should be at least a constant, say ζ , due to truthfulness.
Therefore, the expected verification of F is at least ζ ×Ω(n) = Ω(n). ⊓⊔
Therefore, if a truthful mechanism F verifies o(n) agents and induces a scale invariant and strongly
anonymous allocation rule f , then f needs to be continuous. In Section A.13, we prove that such an alloca-
tion rule f satisfies participation. Then, by Lemma 2.2, we obtain the characterization that such an allocation
rule f is MIDR. Finally, in Section A.14, we show that any full allocation and MIDR rule f is either con-
stant, i.e., its probability distribution does not depend on the valuation profile x, or has a discontinuity at 1.
Thus, we obtain the following characterization:
Theorem 7.1. Let F be any truthful mechanism that verifies o(n) agents, is scale invariant and strongly
anonymous and achieves full allocation. Then, F induces a constant allocation rule.
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Mechanism 2 The Partial Power Mechanism PartPowℓ,r(x, s)
1: pick r tuples t(1), ..., t(r) ∈ N ℓ+1
2: with probability proportional to the value of the term
∑
j∈O xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ+1(j)
3: for each k ∈ {1, ..., r} and agent i ∈ t(k) do
4: if ver(i) 6= 1 then return ⊥
5: with probability 1−∑j f (ℓ,r)j (w) return null
6: pick an outcome j ∈ O and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ
7: with probability proportional to the value of the term xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j)
8: for each agent i ∈ t do
9: if ver(i) 6= 1 then return ⊥
10: return outcome j
8 The Partial Power Mechanism with Selective Verification
The Power mechanism, in Section 5, escapes the characterization of Theorem 7.1 by relaxing participation
(and thus, truthfulness). In this section, we present Partial Power which escapes the characterization by
relaxing full allocation. Thus, Partial Power results in some outcome in O with probability less than 1, and
with the remaining probability, it results in an artificial null outcome for which all agents have valuation 0.
Lemma 2.2 implies that social welfare maximization is essentially necessary for participation. The proof
of Theorem 7.1 implies that maximizing the social welfare over ∆(O) results in discontinuous mechanisms
that need Ω(n) verification (e.g., let m = 2 and consider welfare maximization for weights (1, 1 + ǫ) and
(1, 1−ǫ), see also Lemma A.4). Hence, we optimize over a smooth surface that is close to∆(O), but slightly
curved towards the corners, so that the resulting welfare maximizers are continuous. Precisely, we consider
welfare maximization over the family of sets Zℓ,r =
{
z ∈ Rm≥0 : ‖z‖1+1/ℓ ≤ (1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1)
}
for all
integers ℓ, r ≥ 1. Welfare maximization overZℓ,r results in f (ℓ,r)(w) = (1−1/r)wℓ/
(
m1/(ℓ+1)‖wℓ‖1+1/ℓ
)
(Lemma A.5), a continuous allocation that is MIDR and satisfies participation. Lemma A.6 shows that for
any ℓ ≥ 1, the partial allocation f (ℓ,r) has approximation ratio (1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1) for the social welfare.
We next show that there exists a robust extension PartPowℓ,r of the allocation f (ℓ,r) with reasonable
verification. Thus, we establish that PartPowℓ,r is truthful. To this end, we introduce Mechanism 2. Since
f (ℓ,r) is strongly anonymous, we consider below the weights w ≡ w(x) instead of the valuations x. If all
agents are truthful, PartPowℓ,r samples exactly from f (ℓ,r)(w). In particular, steps 1-4 never result in ⊥,
step 5 outputs null with probability 1 − |f (ℓ,r)(w)|, and steps 6-10 work identically to Powℓ, since given
that the null outcome is not selected, each outcome j is chosen with probability proportional to wℓj .
The most interesting case is when some agents misreport their valuations. To achieve robustness, we
need to ensure that the probability distribution is identical to the case where misreporting agents are excluded
from the mechanism. Similarly to Powℓ, misreporting agents cannot affect the relative probabilities of each
outcome. In PartPowℓ,r however, they may affect the probability of the null outcome. Thus, PartPowℓ,r is
not oblivious and we cannot establish robustness through Lemma 3.1 or some variant of it.
Robustness of PartPowℓ,r is obtained through the special action ⊥, triggered when verification reveals
some misreporting agents. Then, PartPowℓ,r needs to allocate appropriate probabilities to each outcome
j and to the null outcome so that the unconditional probability distribution of PartPowℓ,r is identical to
f (ℓ,r)(wT ), where T is the set of truthful agents. Therefore, whenever PartPowℓ,r returns ⊥, we verify all
agents, compute the weight vector wT for the truthful agents, and return each outcome j with probability:
pj =
f
(ℓ,r)
j (wT )− Pr[PartPowℓ,r(x, s) = j |PartPowℓ,r(x, s) 6= ⊥]Pr[PartPowℓ,r(x, s) 6= ⊥]
Pr[PartPowℓ,r(x, s) = ⊥]
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The null outcome is return with probability 1 −∑j pj . We emphasize that these probabilities are cho-
sen so that we cancel the effect of misreporting agents in the unconditional probability distribution of
PartPowℓ,r and achieve exactly the probability distribution f (ℓ,r)(wT ). Moreover, if the mechanism re-
turns ⊥, we verify all agents. So, it is always possible to compute there probabilities correctly.
The crucial and most technical part of the analysis is to show that pj’s are always non-negative and their
sum is at most 1. To this end, we employ steps 1-4. These steps implement additional verification and ensure
that Pr[PartPowℓ,r(x, s) = ⊥] is large enough for this property to hold (see Section A.16 for the details).
Theorem 8.1. For every ε > 0, there exist ℓ, r ≥ 1, such that Partial Power is truthful, robust, and (1− ε)-
approximate for the social welfare, and verifies at most O(lnm/ε2) agents in the worst case.
9 The Exponential Mechanism with Selective Verification
Next, we consider the well known Exponential mechanism and show that it escapes the characterization of
Section 7 by relaxing scale invariance. The Exponential mechanism (or Expo, for brevity) is strongly anony-
mous and assigns a probability proportional to the exponential of the weight of each outcome. For each valu-
ation profile x, the outcome of Expo depends on w ≡∑ni=1 xi. If all agents are truthful, Expoα(w) results
in outcome j with probability ewj/α/
∑m
q=1 e
wq/α
, i.e., proportional to ewj/α, where α > 0 is a parameter.
As in Section 5, we expand every term ewj/α and verify only the agents in the tuple t corresponding to each
term in the expansion below (the sampling can be implemented as in footnote 3):
ewj/α =
∞∑
ℓ=0
(wj/α)
ℓ
ℓ!
=
∞∑
ℓ=0
α−ℓ
ℓ!
∑
t∈Nℓ
xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j) (4)
The detailed description of Expoα is similar to Mechanism 1, with the only difference that, in the second
step, we pick an outcome j ∈ O, an integer ℓ ≥ 0 and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ with probability proportional to the
value of the term xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j)/(αℓℓ!) (see also Mechanism 5 in the Appendix). The following
summarizes the properties of Expo.
Theorem 9.1. For any α > 0, Expoα(w) is robust and truthful, achieves an additive error of α lnm wrt.
the maximum social welfare and has expected verification ‖w‖∞/α.
Proof (sketch). Using an argument similar to that used for Power (see Section A.9), we can show that Expoα
is oblivious (note that the allocation of Powℓ is obtained from the allocation of Expoα if we condition on a
particular exponent ℓ). Then, robustness follows from Lemma 3.1, because Expoα is a recursive mechanism.
As for participation, the Exponential allocation is known to be MIDR with range Z = ∆(O) and function
h(z) = −α∑j zj ln zj , i.e., α times the entropy of the resulting allocation (see e.g., [18]). Therefore, by
Lemma 2.1, Expoα satisfies participation. Since it is also robust, Lemma 3.2 implies that Expoα is truthful.
For the verification, (4) implies that when all agents are truthful, the number of agents verified, given
that the selected outcome is j, follows a Poisson distribution with parameter wj/α ≤ ‖w‖∞/α. Therefore,
the expected verification is at most ‖w‖∞/α.
As for the approximation guarantee, the optimal social welfare ‖w‖∞ and the objective maximized by
Expoα differ by α times the entropy of the allocation, which is at most α lnm (see also Section A.17). ⊓⊔
In many settings, we know (or can obtain in a truthful way, e.g., by random sampling) an estimation E
of ‖w‖∞ with E ≥ ‖w‖∞ ≥ ρE, for some ρ ∈ (0, 1). Then, we can choose α = ερE/ lnm and obtain an
approximation ratio of 1 − ε with expected verification lnm/(ρε), for any ε > 0. E.g., if for all agents i,
|xi| = 1, n ≥ ‖w‖∞ ≥ n/m. Then, using α = nε/ lnm, we have an additive error of εn with verification
lnm/ε. Moreover, with α = nε/(m lnm), we have approximation ratio 1 − ε with verification m lnm/ε.
Finally, note that, since the number of agents verified follows a Poisson distribution, by Chernoff bounds,
the verification bounds hold with high probability in addition to holding in expectation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Other Related Previous Work
The extensive use of monetary transfers in mechanism design is principally because in absence of money,
very little can be done to enforce truthfulness. However, there are settings where monetary transfers might be
unacceptable, infeasible, or undesirable (see e.g., [27] for examples). To circumvent the impossibility result
of Gibbard-Satterthwaite in such settings, [27] suggested to tradeoff social efficiency for truthfulness and
introduced the framework of approximate mechanism design without money. The idea is to consider truthful
mechanisms without money in a particular domain and determine the best approximation ratio achievable
for an appropriate social objective.
In principle, the notion of approximate mechanisms provides the designer with more flexibility. Nev-
ertheless, there have been only few examples of truthful mechanisms with good approximation guarantees
that are not based on additional assumptions. All of them concern some simple and restricted domains (see
for e.g., [1,12,22,27] for placing 1 or 2 facilities in a metric space and [26] for voting with positional scoring
rules). For less restricted domains, there are strong lower bounds on the best possible approximation ratio
achievable by truthful mechanisms (see e.g., [14] for deterministic facility location mechanisms). Therefore,
for nontrivial approximation guarantees, we need either some assumptions on the direction or the extent of
agent misreports, i.e., to use verification, or a way to implicitly penalize misreports, a.k.a. imposition.
Probably the most natural and practically applicable notion of verification is symmetric partial verifi-
cation (or ε-verification), which explicitly forbids any false declaration at distance larger than ε to the true
type. Interestingly, [2,6,15] prove that symmetric partial verification it does not help in the design of truthful
mechanisms (with or without money)! Hence, in order to make some difference in approximate mechanism
design without money, verification should be exact, in the sense that it forbids even negligible deviations
from the truth, at least for some types of misreports. Many interesting positive results in approximate mech-
anism design without money use either “one-sided” verification or imposition (see e.g., [11,13,19,23,25]).
However, the use of imposition depends very much on the particular application (see e.g., [13,19,25]), while
“one-sided” verification explicitly forbids a particular type of false declarations for all agents with positive
utility (see e.g., [11]). So, through theoretically interesting, “one-sided” verification is difficult to apply in
practice. Thus, starting from [6], recent research has focused on the power of exact verification schemes that
use either limited or costly verification and mild (or at least bounded) penalties for the liars.
Working in this direction, we seek a better and more delicate understanding of the power of verification
in approximate mechanism design without money. Significantly departing from most of the previous work,
we develop a general approach to the use of verification in mechanism design without money that is appli-
cable to essentially any domain and does not resort to any explicit (e.g., monetary) penalties that decrease
the utility of misreporting agents.
A.2 Conclusions and Discussion
In this work, we introduce a general approach to approximate mechanism design without money and with
selective verification and apply it to the general domain of utilitarian voting (and to Combinatorial Public
Project and to k-Facility Location). We focus on strongly anonymous randomized mechanisms and char-
acterize such mechanisms that are truthful in expectation, scale invariant, achieve full allocation and have
reasonable verification. By relaxing truthfulness, full allocation and scale invariance, we obtain three mech-
anisms, namely Power, Partial Power, and Exponential, that are truthful (or almost truthful, for Power),
achieve an approximation ratio of 1− ε for the social welfare, and verify O(lnm/ε) agents, or O(lnm/ε2)
agents for Partial Power, where m is the number of outcomes. Hence, we obtained a smoothed tradeoff
between the number of agents verified and the quality of approximation. From a technical viewpoint, our
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mechanisms are based on smooth proportional-like randomized allocation rules. Truthfulness is a conse-
quence of participation, which is closely related to maximal-in-distributional-range, and robustness, which
is closely related to obliviousness to the misreporting agents not included in the verification set.
The property of robustness, i.e., namely that the probability distribution of the mechanism does not
depend on misreporting agents, seems quite remarkable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that robustness (or a similar) property is considered in mechanism design. Actually, with the possible
exception of constant mechanisms, whose probability distribution over outcomes is independent of the agent
declarations, a mechanism can be robust only if it uses exact verification.
To see that robustness is a strong property, recall that truthfulness means that a misreporting agent can-
not change the allocation in her favor, while robustness means that a misreporting agent cannot change the
allocation whatsoever. Hence, the definition (and the proof) of truthfulness assumes a utility function that
each agent maximizes by truthful reporting. Robustness, on the other hand, does not refer to the utility func-
tion of the agents. Any misreport that can be caught by the verification oracle does not affect the probability
distribution of a robust mechanism, no matter the incentives or the utility function of misreporting agents.
We believe that robustness can be very useful when the agent valuations are not declared explicitly to
the mechanism, but they are deduced from their declarations on some observable types. E.g., this happens in
the Facility Location domain, where the agents declare their locations to the mechanism, and the definition
of truthfulness assumes that each agent wants a facility as close as possible to her declared location and that
her disutility increases linearly with the distance (see also [12]). On the other hand, robustness only depends
on whether each agent declares her true location (e.g., her true home address) to the mechanism, not on
whether she wants a facility close, not so close, or far away from her declared location.
A.3 An Application to Combinatorial Public Project
The Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) was introduced in [28,24] and is a well-studied problem
in algorithmic mechanism design. An instance of CPPP consists of a set R with r resources, a parameter
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ r, and n strategic agents, where each agent i has a function xi : 2R → R≥0 that assigns a
non-negative valuation xi(S) to each resource subset S ⊆ R. The objective is to find a set C of k resources
that maximizes
∑
i xi(C), i.e., the social welfare of the agents from C . We assume that all valuations xi are
normalized, i.e., xi(∅) = 0, and monotone, i.e., xi(S1) ≤ xi(S2) for all S1 ⊆ S2.
The valuation functions xi are implicitly represented through a value oracle, which returns the valuation
xi(S) of any resource subset S in O(1) time. Then, CPPP is NP-hard and practically inapproximable in
polynomial time, under standard computational complexity assumptions (see [28] for the details). If the
valuation functions xi are submodular, i.e., each xi satisfies xi(S1∪S2)+xi(S1∩S2) ≤ xi(S1)+xi(S2),
for all S1, S2 ⊆ R, CPPP can be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of 1−1/e. If the valuation
functions xi are subadditive, i.e., each xi satisfies xi(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ xi(S1) + xi(S2), for all S1, S2 ⊆ R,
CPPP can be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of r−1/2, while approximating it within any
factor better than r−1/4+ε, for any constant ε > 0, requires exponential communication [28].
In [24], it was shown that for submodular valuations, CPPP cannot be approximated in polynomial
time (or with polynomial communication) by deterministic truthful mechanisms (with money) within any
factor better than r−1/2+ε, for any constant ε > 0. A similar communication complexity lower bound
was shown in [8] for randomized truthful in expectation mechanisms with money. So, the polynomial-time
approximability of CPPP with submodular valuations is dramatically better than its approximability by
polynomial-time truthful mechanisms with money. Although the approximability of CPPP by polynomial
time truthful mechanisms with money has received considerable attention, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time that the approximability of CPPP by truthful mechanisms without money is considered.
CPPP, with general valuation functions, can be naturally cast in our framework of utilitarian voting, with
the outcome set O consisting of all resource subsets S with |S| = k (hence, we have m ≤ rk). Then, our
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mechanisms imply the following results on the approximability of CPPP with general valuation functions
by mechanisms without money and with selective verification:
Power. For any ε > 0, the Power mechanism always allocates a set of k resources, is robust, ε-truthful,
achieves an approximation ratio of 1− ε and verifies at most k log r/ε agents.
Partial Power. For any ε > 0, the Partial Power mechanism allocates a set of k resources with probability
1−O(ε), is robust, truthful, achieves an approximation ratio of 1− ε and verifies O(k log r/ε2) agents.
Note that the empty set can naturally play the role of the null outcome for Partial Power.
Exponential. Since Exponential is not scale invariant, we need to assume that maxS⊆R,|S|≤k xi(S) ≤ 1, for
every agent i. Then, for any ε > 0, the Exponential mechanism always allocates a set of k resources, is
robust, truthful, and achieves an additive error of εn with verification of O(k log r/ε) agents, or achieves
an approximation ratio of 1−ε with verification of O(krk log r/ε) agents (where the verification bounds
hold with high probability).
These guarantees are very strong and rather surprising, especially if the number n of agents is signifi-
cantly larger than k log r, which is the case in many practical settings. We almost reach the optimal social
welfare of the famous VCG mechanism, which achieves truthfulness through (potentially very large) pay-
ments, using truthful mechanisms without money that verify a small number of agents independent of n.
It becomes even more interesting if we recall that the penalty for a misreporting agent, through which we
enforce truthfulness, is just the exclusion of the agent’s preferences from the decision making process.
The mechanisms above run in time polynomial in the total number of outcomes rk and in the number
of agents n. So, if the valuation functions are implicitly represented by value oracles, they are not computa-
tionally efficient. However, we still need to resort to approximate solutions, because, in absence of money,
the optimal solution is not truthful. We underline that computational inefficiency is unavoidable, since our
approximation ratio of 1− ε, for any constant ε > 0, is dramatically better than known impossibility results
on the polynomial time approximability of CPPP.
If we insist on computationally efficient mechanisms without money for CPPP, we can combine our
mechanisms with existing maximal-in-range mechanisms so that everything runs in polynomial time. E.g.,
for CPPP with subadditive valuation functions, we can use the maximal-in-range mechanism of [28, Sec. 3.2]
and obtain randomized polynomial-time truthful mechanisms without money that achieve an approximation
ratio of O(min{k,√r}) for the social welfare with selective verification of O(k log r) agents.
A.4 The Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let i be any agent. Since the allocation rule f is MIDR, we obtain the following inequalities:
n∑
j=1
xj · f(x) + h(f(x)) ≥
n∑
j=1
xj · f(x−i) + h(f(x−i))
∑
j 6=i
xj · f(x−i) + h(f(x−i)) ≥
∑
j 6=i
xj · f(x) + h(f(x))
We apply the MIDR condition to x, for the first inequality, and to x−i, for the second inequality. Summing
up the two inequalities, we obtain that xi · f(x) ≥ xi · f(x−i), i.e., the participation condition. ⊓⊔
A.5 Continuous Allocation Rules with Participation: The Proof of Lemma 2.2
Recall that for any valuation profile x, the probability distribution of a strongly anonymous allocation rule
f depends only on the weight vector w(x) of the outcomes. Hence, we fix a pair of arbitrary weight vectors
w,v ∈ Rm≥0. For any a ∈ (0, 1), since f satisfies participation, we have that
(1− a)w · f(av + (1− a)w) ≥ (1− a)w · f(av)
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Using that a 6= 1 and scale invariance, i.e., that f(av) = f(v), we obtain that
w · f(av + (1− a)w) ≥ w · f(v)
This holds for every a ∈ (0, 1). Thus, taking the limit as a goes to 0 and using the hypothesis that f is
continuous, we get that for all weight vectors w,v ∈ Rm≥0,
w · f(w) ≥ w · f(v)
We can now define Z as the image set of f , i.e., Z = {z | ∃v such that z = f(v)}. Using the previous
inequality, we obtain that for all weight vectors w and all z ∈ Z , w · f(w) ≥ w · z. Since f(w) ∈ Z , a
necessary condition for f to satisfy participation is that f(w) = argmaxz∈Z w · z. ⊓⊔
A.6 The Proof of Lemma 3.2
Since F is robust, for any agent i, for any valuation pair xi and yi and for all reported valuations y−i and
verification vectors s−i,
F ((y−i,xi), (s−i, 1)) = F (((yT )−i,xi), (1, . . . , 1)) and
F ((y−i,yi), (s−i, 0)) = F ((yT )−i, (1, . . . , 1))
Here, we assume that xi is i’s true type and yi 6= xi is a misreport. Moreover, using that f (i.e., the allocation
rule induced by F on truthful reports) satisfies ǫ-participation, we have that:
xi · F (((yT )−i,xi), (1, . . . , 1)) ≥ ǫxi · F ((yT )−i, (1, . . . , 1))
Combining the three equations above, we obtain that
xi · F ((y−i,xi), (s−i, 1)) ≥ ǫxi · F ((y−i,yi), (s−i, 0) ,
i.e., that the mechanism with verification F is ǫ-truthful. ⊓⊔
A.7 k-Facility Location: Minimizing the Maximum Cost
We first introduce some pieces of notation and terminology that we need for this section and for Section A.8.
For k-Facility Location problems, we consider an underlying metric space (M,d), where M is a finite set
of points and d : M ×M 7→ R≥0 is a distance function, which is non-negative, symmetric, and satisfies the
triangle inequality. For each t ∈M and M ′ ⊆M , we let d(t,M ′) = min{d(t, t′) : t′ ∈M ′}.
The outcomes are all subsets of k locations in M , i.e., all C ⊆ M with |C| = k. Each agent i has a
preferred location ti ∈M and her “valuation” for outcome C is xi(C) = −d(ti, C), i.e., minus the distance
of her preferred location to the nearest facility in C . The minus sign is due to the cost minimization nature
of the problem. So, each agent i aims at minimizing d(ti, C).
A (possibly randomized) mechanism F takes as input a profile z = (z1, . . . , zn) of reported locations4.
Using oracle access to a verification vector s, the mechanism F maps z to a set C ⊆M of k facilities. The
cost of each agent i is the expected distance of her true location ti to the nearest facility in C . For clarity, we
denote i’s expected cost as cost[ti, F (z, s)] = EC∼F (z,s)[d(ti, C)], which agent i seeks to minimize.
4 Note that in Facility Location, each agent declares an “observable” type, namely, her preferred location, to the mechanism and
not her entire valuation / cost function, as she does in the utilitarian voting domain. The mechanism deduces her cost function
based on her reported “observable” type.
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Mechanism 3 The Greedy Mechanism G(z, s) for k-Facility Location
L← ∅ ; Pick the first agent i ∈ z and let C ← {zi}
while |C| < k do
i← argmaxi∈z d(zi, C)
C ← C ∪ {zi}
for all zi ∈ C do
if ver(i) 6= 1 then L← L ∪ {i}
if L 6= ∅ then return G(z−L, s−L)
else return C
The main properties (e.g., truthfulness, robustness, approximation ratio) of a Facility Location mecha-
nism with verification are defined as in Sections 2 and 3, with the only difference that the agents now seek
to minimize their costs. E.g., a mechanism with verification F is truthful if for any agent i, for any location
pair ti and zi, and for all reported locations z−i and verification vectors s−i,
cost[ti, F ((z−i, ti), (s−i, 1))] ≤ cost[ti, F ((z−i, zi), (s−i, 0))]
In this section, we focus on minimizing maxi∈N{d(ti, F (t,1))}, i.e., the maximum distance of any
agent to the nearest facility. The Greedy mechanism (or G, for brevity, see Mechanism 3) is a truthful and
robust extension of the 2-approximate Greedy algorithm for k-Center (see e.g., [30, Section 2.2]). In the
description of Greedy, we write i ∈ z to denote that the reported location of agent i participates in the
location profile z. Also, we assume that ties are broken in some fixed deterministic way. We next prove
Theorem 4.1, stated in Section 4.
Proof (of Theorem 4.1). Clearly, Ver(G) = k, since if all agents are truthful, Greedy verifies only the agents
allocated a facility. Moreover, the approximation ratio of Greedy is 2 (see e.g., [30, Theorem 2.3]).
By Lemma 3.2, to show that Greedy is truthful, it suffices to show that Greedy is robust and satisfies
participation. As for the latter, we fix an agent i with true location ti and a location profile z−i. If ti is
allocated a facility in (z−i, ti), i’s cost is 0. Otherwise, excluding ti from (z−i, ti) does not affect the
execution of Greedy and i’s cost is the same in (z−i, ti) and in z−i.
By Lemma 3.1, robustness follows from the obliviousness of Greedy, since Greedy is a recursive mecha-
nism with verification. As for obliviousness, let us assume that all agents in C are truthful. Then, for any set
L, with C ∩L = ∅, the outcome of Greedy on both z and z−L is C . In words, if all agents in C are truthful,
the agents not in C do not affect the outcome of Greedy. Therefore, Greedy is oblivious and robust. ⊓⊔
A.8 k-Facility Location: Minimizing the Social Cost
In this section, we focus on minimizing
∑n
i=1 d(ti, F (t,1)), i.e, the total distance of the agents to the nearest
facility of the mechanism. One may regard this version of k-Facility Location as a welfare maximization
problem but with negative valuations.
Mechanism 4 (or P , for brevity) is a truthful and robust extension of the Proportional mechanism [22],
which achieves an approximation ratio of Θ(ln k) for the objective of social cost [3]. Mechanism 4 is essen-
tially a randomized version of Mechanism 3. We next prove Theorem 4.2, stated in Section 4.
Proof (of Theorem 4.2). The approximation ratio of Mechanism 4 is shown in [3, Theorem 5.1]. Moreover,
Ver(P ) = k, since if all agents report truthfully, Proportional verifies only the agents allocated a facility.
By Lemma 3.2, it suffices to show that Proportional is robust and satisfies participation. The proof is a
generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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Mechanism 4 The Proportional Mechanism P (z, s) for k-Facility Location
L← ∅ ; Pick an agent i ∈ z uniformly at random and let C ← {zi}
while |C| < k do
pick an agent i ∈ z with probability d(zi, C)/
∑
j∈z d(zj , C)
C ← C ∪ {zi}
for all zi ∈ C do
if ver(i) 6= 1 then L← L ∪ {i}
if L 6= ∅ then return P (z−L, s−L)
else return C
By Lemma 3.1, robustness follows from the obliviousness of Proportional, since Proportional is a recur-
sive mechanism with verification. The obliviousness of Proportional was first observed in [13]. Since our
setting is different, we include a proof here for completeness. So, we next show that for all location profiles
z and verification vectors s, with L = N \ T (s), and all outcomes C ,
Pr[P (z, s) = C |C ∩ L = ∅] = Pr[P (z−L,1) = C] (5)
which implies that Proportional is oblivious (note also that any possible C 6⊆ T (s) has probability 0). To
establish (5), we observe that conditional on the event that no misreporting agent is selected in C by P (z, s),
the probability distribution of P (z, s) is identical to the probability distribution of P (z−L,1). This claim is
shown by induction on the number of selected agents and a simple coupling argument. To this end, let us fix
a location profile z and the set L of misreporting agents in z. The first agent is selected uniformly at random
from N \ L both by P (z, s), conditional on the event that the selected agent is not in L, and by P (z−L,1).
Assume inductively that both executions P (z, s), conditional on C ∩ L = ∅, and P (z−L,1) agree on the
selected set C up to some point. Then, the next agent in C is selected by both executions from exactly
the same probability distribution, since due to the conditioning, P (z, s) does not consider any agents in L.
Finally, since the set C of k agents selected by both executions does not include any agents from L, both
executions result in C with identical probability.
We next show that Mechanism 4 satisfies participation. We fix an agent i with location ti and a location
profile t−i. Since participation is a property of the allocation rule, we assume that all agents are truthful and
completely ignore verification from this point on. So, we simply write P (t), instead of P (t, s).
For each round ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k, we let cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ] be the expected cost of i at the end of the P ,
given that the facility set of P (t) at the end of round ℓ is Cℓ. Similarly, we let cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ] be the
expected cost of i at the end of the P (t−i), given that i does not participate in the mechanism and that the
facility set of P at the end of round ℓ is Cℓ.
For ℓ = k, cost[ti, P (t)|Ck] = cost[ti, P (t−i)|Ck] = d(ti, Ck). For each round ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1, if i
participates in the mechanism, with probability proportional to d(ti, Cℓ) the next facility is placed at ti, in
which case i’s cost is 0, while for each agent j 6= i, with probability proportional to d(tj , Cℓ) the next facility
is placed at tj , in which case the expected cost of i is cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ ∪ {tj}]. Therefore, the expected cost
of i is:
cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ] =
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ) cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ ∪ {tj}]
d(ti, Cℓ) +
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ)
(6)
For ℓ = 0, the expected cost of agent i is:
cost[ti, P (t)] =
∑
j 6=i cost[ti, P (t)|{tj}]
n
(7)
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If i does not participate in the mechanism, her expected cost for ℓ = 1, . . . , k is:
cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ] =
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ) cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ ∪ {tj}]∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ)
(8)
If i does not participate in the mechanism, her expected cost for ℓ = 0 is:
cost[ti, P (t−i)] =
∑
j 6=i cost[ti, P (t−i)|{tj}]
n− 1 (9)
Using induction on ℓ, we next show that for any round ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k and any set Cℓ,
cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ] ≤ cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ] (10)
Clearly, (10) implies that P (Mechanism 4) satisfies participation.
For the basis of the induction, we observe that (10) holds trivially for ℓ = k. We inductively assume that
(10) holds for ℓ+1 and any facility set Cℓ+1, and show that (10) holds for ℓ and any facility set Cℓ. If ℓ ≥ 1,
we use (8) and obtain that:
cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ] =
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ) cost[ti, P (t−i)|Cℓ ∪ {tj}]∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ)
≥
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ) cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ ∪ {tj}]
d(ti, Cℓ) +
∑
j 6=i d(tj , Cℓ)
= cost[ti, P (t)|Cℓ]
The inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and that d(ti, Cℓ) ≥ 0. The second equality is (6).
If ℓ = 0, we use (9) and obtain that:
cost[ti, P (t−i)] =
∑
j 6=i cost[ti, P (t−i)|{tj}]
n− 1
≥
∑
j 6=i cost[ti, P (t)|{tj}]
n
= cost[ti, P (t)]
The inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that n > n − 1. The second equality is
(7). Thus we have established (10) for any round ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k, and any facility set Cℓ.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.2, we observe that since P is robust and satisfies participation, it is
also truthful, by Lemma 3.2. ⊓⊔
A.9 The Proof of Theorem 5.1
We establish the properties of Powℓ for any ℓ ≥ 0. To obtain Theorem 5.1, we set ℓ = lnm/ε.
If all agents are truthful, Powℓ picks an outcome j and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ and returns j after verifying all
agents in t. Since there are at most ℓ different agent indices in t, the verification of Powℓ is at most ℓ.
Due to its proportional nature, Powℓ is oblivious to the declarations of misreporting agents not verified
(see also the proof of obliviousness for Proportional, in Section A.8). Specifically, we show that for all
valuation profiles x and verification vectors s, with L = N \ T (s), and all outcomes j,
Pr[Powℓ(x, s) = j |V (x) ∩ L = ∅] = Pr[Powℓ(x−L,1) = j] (11)
Therefore, Powℓ is oblivious. Since it is also recursive, Lemma 3.1 implies that Powℓ is robust.
To prove (11), we observe that for any outcome j, the condition V (x) ∩L = ∅ implies that Powℓ(x, s)
selects only terms xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j) with truthful agents in T (s). Every term with some valuation
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xt′(j) of a misreporting agent t′ ∈ L is excluded, since V (x)∩L = ∅ implies that t ∈ T (s)ℓ. Therefore, for
any outcome j, Powℓ(x, s), conditional on V (x) ∩ L = ∅, and Powℓ(x−L,1) have exactly the same set of
“allowable” terms from which they select xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j) and t. In both, each such term is selected
with probability proportional to its value. Taking all outcomes into account, we obtain that the distribution
of Powℓ(x, s), conditional on V (x) ∩ L = ∅, and the distribution of Powℓ(x−L,1) are identical.
We next establish the approximation ratio of Powℓ for the objective of maximizing the social welfare.
The intuition is that as ℓ increases from 0 to ∞, the probability distribution of Powℓ sharpens from the
uniform allocation, where each outcome is selected with probability 1/m, to the optimal allocation. The
rate of this transition determines the approximation ratio and is quantified by the following.
Lemma A.1. For any ℓ ≥ 0, Powℓ is m−1/(ℓ+1)-approximate for the social welfare.
Proof. Let us fix any valuation profile x and let w ≡ w(x) be the outcome weights in x. For the approxima-
tion ratio, we can assume that all agents are truthful. So, we let Powℓ(w) ≡ Powℓ(x,1), for convenience.
The optimal social welfare is ‖w‖∞. The expected social welfare of the mechanism is w · Powℓ(w) =
|wℓ+1|/|wℓ|. So the approximation ratio of Powℓ is equal to:
|wℓ+1|
|wℓ| ‖w‖∞ =
(‖w‖ℓ+1)ℓ+1
(‖w‖ℓ)ℓ ‖w‖∞ =
(‖w‖ℓ+1
‖w‖ℓ
)ℓ ‖w‖ℓ+1
‖w‖∞
Using that ‖w‖∞ ≤ ‖w‖ℓ+1 and that ‖w‖ℓ ≤ m(
1
ℓ
− 1
ℓ+1)‖w‖ℓ+1 = m1/ℓ(ℓ+1)‖w‖ℓ+1, we obtain that the
approximation ratio of Powℓ is at least m−1/(ℓ+1). ⊓⊔
Unfortunately, Power does not satisfy participation. For a simple example, let m = 2 and n = 2 and
let x1 = (1, 0) and x2 = (3/4, 1/4). Then, agent 2 prefers outcome 1, but her participation decreases its
probability from 1, when agent 1 is alone, to something less than 1, when both agents participate.
However, Power satisfies participation approximately. To prove this, we use the fact that the Partial
Power allocation (see Section 8) is MIDR, by definition, and essentially a slightly “curved” version of
Power. Using that the probabilities that each outcome is selected in Partial Power and in Power are close
to each other and the fact that Partial Power satisfies participation, we obtain the following. Since Powℓ is
robust and satisfies m−1/(ℓ+1)-participation, Lemma 3.2 implies that Powℓ is m−1/(ℓ+1)-truthful.
Lemma A.2. For any ℓ ≥ 0, Powℓ satisfies m−1/(ℓ+1)-participation.
Proof. Let us fix any valuation profile x and let w ≡ w(x) be the outcome weights in x. Since partici-
pation is a property of the allocation rule, we can assume wlog. that all agents are truthful in x. So, we let
Powℓ(w) ≡ Powℓ(x,1), for convenience.
We need to show that for any agent i, her expected utility wrt. the probability distribution of Powℓ(w)
is no less than m−1/(ℓ+1) times her expected utility wrt. the probability distribution of Powℓ(w−i). Since
Powℓ(w) selects each outcome j with probability wℓj/|wℓ|, we need to show that for any agent i,
m
1
ℓ+1
xi ·wℓ
|wℓ| ≥
xi ·wℓ−i
|wℓ−i|
In Section A.15, Lemma A.5, we consider the Partial Power allocation with parameter ℓ (and with
1− 1/r = 1) and show that it is MIDR with range Zℓ =
{
z ∈ Rm≥0 : ‖z‖1+1/ℓ ≤ m−1/(ℓ+1)
}
and function
h(z) = 0. Therefore, by Lemma 2.1, Partial Power satisfies participation. To establish that Powℓ satisfies
participation, we observe that Partial Power with parameter ℓ is essentially a slightly “curved” version of
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Powℓ, where each outcome j is selected with probability w
ℓ
j
m1/(1+ℓ)‖wℓ‖1+1/ℓ
, instead of wℓj/|wℓ| in Powℓ.
Using the fact that Partial Power satisfies participation, we obtain that for any agent i,
xi ·wℓ
‖wℓ‖1+ 1
ℓ
≥ xi ·w
ℓ
−i
‖wℓ−i‖1+ 1
ℓ
Since for any m-dimensional vector y, |y| ≥ ‖y‖1+1/ℓ ≥ 1m1/(ℓ+1) |y|, we have that
m
1
ℓ+1
xi ·wℓ
|wℓ| ≥
xi ·wℓ
‖wℓ‖1+ 1
ℓ
≥ xi ·w
ℓ
−i
‖wℓ−i‖1+ 1
ℓ
≥ xi ·w
ℓ
−i
|wℓ−i|
Thus, Powℓ satisfies m−1/(ℓ+1)-participation. ⊓⊔
A.10 A Detailed Proof of Theorem 6.1
In this section, we give a detailed proof of Theorem 6.1 from scratch, for completeness and clarity. Recall
that the proof describes a random family of instances where any strongly anonymous truthful mechanism
needs to verify a logarithmic number of agents in expectation.
To define such instances, we consider m outcomes and m disjoint groups of agents. Each group has a
large number ν of agents. An agent in group j has valuation 0 for any outcome other than j and valuation
either 1 or δ for outcome j, where δ > 0 is extremely small (e.g., δ = 1/ν10). In each group j, the probability
that exactly k, 0 ≤ k ≤ ν, agents have valuation 1 for outcome j is 2−(k+1).
The expected total valuation of each outcome is essentially 1, since ν is very large and νδ is negligible.
The probability that a group j has at least logm agents with valuation 1 is 2− logm = 1/m. Hence, the
probability that some group has at least logm agents with valuation 1 is 1 − (1 − 1/m)m ≥ 1− exp(−1).
A similar analysis shows that the probability that some group has more than 2 logm agents with valuation
1 is at most 1/m. Therefore, the expected maximum social welfare of such instances is Θ(logm). In fact,
one can show that a random instance has maximum social welfare Θ(logm) with high probability.
We next consider any truthful mechanism F with expected social welfare of Ω(logm) for such instances
and show that F needs to verify a logarithmic number of agents. To this end, we focus on a group j of
agents and fix x−j , i.e., the declarations of the agents in all other groups. Now we can assume wlog. that
the probability of outcome j depends only on the number of agents in group j that declare valuation 1 for
outcome j. To see that this is indeed wlog., we first observe that the number of agents that declare 1 for j
fully determines the number of agents that declare δ for j. Moreover, if the probability of outcome j depends
on the identities of the agents that declare 1, then we could randomly permute the agents in group j (and in
all other groups) before running the mechanism F . This would lead to an anonymous mechanism with the
same approximation and verification guarantees. Thus wlog. for any fixed x−j , F should induce a sequence
of probabilities p0, p1, . . . , pk, · · · , where pk is the probability of outcome j, given that the number of agents
that declare valuation 1 for outcome j is k. Since the mechanism F is truthful, if k agents declare valuation
1 for outcome j, we need to verify each of them with probability at least pk − pk−1. To see this, observe
that the expected utility of an agent with valuation δ for outcome j is pk−1δ, if she is truthful, and at least
pkδ times the probability that she is not verified, if she is not truthful and declares 1. Since the former is no
less than the later (and since pk ∈ [0, 1]), F needs to verify any agent that declares 1 for j with probability
at least pk − pk−1. In words, verifying each agent that declares 1 for outcome j with probability at least
pk − pk−1 is a sufficient condition for truthfulness.
Therefore, for any fixed x−j , when k agents declare 1 for outcome j, we need an expected verification
of at least k(pk − pk−1) only for agents in group j. Assuming truthful reporting and taking the expectation
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over the number of agents in group j with valuation 1, we obtain that an expected verification of:
ν∑
k=0
2−(k+1)k(pk − pk−1) ≥
ν∑
k=0
2−(k+1)pk(k − (k + 1)/2)
=
1
2
ν∑
k=0
2−(k+1)pkk − 1
2
ν∑
k=0
2−(k+1)pk
= E[welfarej |x−j]/2 − Pr[outcome j |x−j]/2
Note that the last equality ignores a negligible term of at most νδ. Hence, the expected verification for agents
in group j is at least half the expected social welfare of the mechanism from group j, conditional on x−j ,
minus half the probability of outcome j in F , conditional on x−j .
Removing the conditioning on x−j and summing up over all groups j, we obtain that the expected
verification is at least E[welfare]/2−1/2 (with expectations taken over the random choices of the mechanism
and over the random instances). Since such instances have a maximum social welfare of Θ(logm) with high
probability and since the mechanism achieves a constant approximation ratio, the mechanism F on a random
instance requires an expected verification of Ω(logm) (the expectation is taken over the random choices of
the mechanism) with high probability (the high probability refers to the selection of the instance). ⊓⊔
Remark A.1. In the proof of Theorem 6.1, we assume for simplicity that ν is large and δ is tiny, so that νδ is
negligible. In fact, it suffices to use ν = logm/ε, for some small enough constant ε > 0, and δ = 1/ logm.
The proof is essentially identical, only the final calculations change. However, since now the total number
of agents is n = m logm/ε, and log n = Θ(logm), we obtain that even if verification is quantified wrt. the
number n of agents, we still need logarithmic verification.
A.11 Lower Bound on Truthful Mechanisms without Verification
In this section we see that any truthful mechanism without verification achieves the same social welfare as
the constant uniform allocation rule. This demonstrates the importance and the quality of our results in a
fully general setting such as utilitarian voting. The following theorem is true even for partial allocation rules
which means that even this opportunity without verification is useless.
Theorem A.1. Any randomized truthful mechanism without money and without verification (full or partial
allocation) has approximation ratio to the optimal social welfare at most m−1 if we have large enough
number of agents.
Proof. Let f be a truthful allocation rule. Consider the instance where we have m different outcomes and
m single-minded agents. Each agent i has valuation one for the outcome i (i.e. xi(i) = 1) and zero for the
others (i.e. xi(j) = 0 for j 6= i). Let pi be the probability of the outcome i in this instance according to
f (i.e. pi = fi(x)) and let j = argmini pi. Since
∑
i pi ≤ 1 we have that pj ≤ m−1. Lets assume now
that the valuation of agent j for the outcome j increases and all the other valuations remain the same. We
define pj(xj(j)) = fj(x−j ,xj), where xj = (0, . . . , 0, xj(j), 0, . . . , 0). Since f is truthful we have that pj
should be non decreasing function of xj(j) otherwise f does not satisfy monotonicity and therefore is not
truthfully implementable even with monetary transfers [2]. We prove that pj(xj(j)) is a constant function
as xj(j) increases. Lets assume the opposite, then there exists an L ≥ 1 such that pj(L) > pj , because pj is
non decreasing. Then agent j has more expected utility if he reports L instead of his real valuation which is
1 and so f is not truthful. Therefore pj(xj(j)) = pj for all xj(j). Now consider the same instance as before
with the difference that xj(j) is much larger. The optimal social welfare is xj(j) whereas f gets welfare
21
at most 1 + xj(j) ·m−1 where the first term comes from the total valuation of all the agents but j and the
second term from the fact that pj ≤ m−1. Finally the approximation ratio of f as xj(j) goes to infinity is
lim
xj(j)→∞
1 + xj(j) ·m−1
xj(j)
= m−1
⊓⊔
We notice that an approximation ratio of m−1 is achievable by the mechanism that select an outcome
uniformly at random without taking into account the valuations of the agent. So the uniform mechanism is
worst-case optimal for truthfully maximizing welfare without money in the utilitarian voting setting.
A.12 Truthfulness and Low Verification Imply Continuity: The Proof of Lemma 7.1
Since all our mechanisms and allocation rules are strongly anonymous, throughout this section, we refer to
strongly anonymous and scale invariant mechanisms / rules just as scale invariant mechanisms / rules, for
simplicity and brevity. Moreover, since we focus on strongly anonymous mechanisms / allocation rules, we
always consider the weight vector w(x) ≡ x of the outcomes induced by a valuation profile x, instead of
the valuation profile x.
Before we start with the proof, we observe that, by scale invariance, any allocation rule f cannot be
continuous at 0, since this would imply that f is a constant allocation that does not depend on the input (to
see this, start from any weight vector w and choose an scaling factor α that tends to 0). For this and for
similar technical reasons, in this and in the following sections, we restrict our attention to weight vectors
w with strictly positive value in each coordinate. Thus, we let R+ = {x ∈ R : x > 0} and focus on
mechanisms / allocation rules restricted to the domain Rm+ . Moreover, we prove some of our results for the
general case that the image set of the mechanism / allocation rule is not restricted to the simplex ∆(O), but
it is the more general Rm+ .
Before the proof of Lemma 7.1, we recall the definition of continuity of a real multivariable function. A
function f : Rm+ → Rm+ is continuous if for every w ∈ Rm+
lim
v→w
f(v) = f(w)
Moreover, given a vector w ∈ Rm+ , a multiset p = {v1, . . . ,vn}, with each vi ∈ Rm+ , is called a partition
of w if w =
∑
vi∈p
vi. We let P (w) denote the set of all possible partitions of a vector w.
Proof (of Lemma 7.1). We first show that if f has a discontinuity, there are Ω(n) agents that have a very
small valuation δ > 0 and can change the allocation by a constant factor, independent of n and δ.
To this end, we let w be the point of discontinuity of f . So lim
v→w
f(v) either does not exist or it is
different from f(w). In both cases, by the definition of continuity, there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for every
δ > 0 there is a point vδ such that |vδ −w| ≤ δ and |f(vδ)− f(w)| ≥ ǫ.
Claim. For every δ > 0, there is a vδ with the above properties and vδ ≤ w.
Proof (of the claim). Let C = minj wj and D = maxj wj . Then we take a vδ′ with δ′ ≤ Dδ/(m(C +D)).
Now we define z = vδ′/(1 + δ
′
C ). If (vδ′)j ≤ wj , then zj ≤ wj . On the other hand, if (vδ′)j ≥ wj , then,
since w ∈ Rm+ and wj 6= 0,
(vδ′)j − wj ≤ δ′ ⇒ (vδ
′)j
1 + δ′/wj
≤ wj , but zj = (vδ
′)j
1 + δ′/C
≤ (vδ′)j
1 + δ′/wj
⇒ zj ≤ wj
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Now we bound |z −w|. If (yδ′)j ≥ wj then wj − zj ≤ wj − wj/
(
1 + δ
′
C
)
= wj
(
δ′
C+δ′
)
. Otherwise,
by the definition of (vδ′)j we have that (vδ′)j ≥ wj − δ′ and therefore wj − zj ≤ wj − (wj − δ′)/
(
1 + δ
′
C
)
.
Hence, in any case, we have that
wj − zj ≤ wj
(
δ′
C + δ′
)
+ δ′
(
C
C + δ′
)
≤ D
(
δ′
C + δ′
)
+ δ′
(
C
C + δ′
)
After summing up for all j, we get
|w − z| ≤ mδ′
(
D + C
C + δ′
)
≤ m
(
D + C
C
)
δ′ ≤ δ ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of δ′. Now, since f is scale invariant, we know that
f(vδ′) = f(z). Therefore, |f(z) − f(w)| ≥ ǫ and |z −w| ≤ δ and z ≤ w. Since we can do so for every
δ > 0, we have found the required vδ = z. ⊓⊔
Now since |f(vδ)−f(w)| ≥ ǫ there exists j ∈ [m] such that for ε = ǫ/mwe have |fj(w)−fj(vδ)| ≥ ε.
This means that either fj(w)− fj(vδ) ≥ ε or fj(vδ)− fj(w) ≥ ε.
Assume fj(w)− fj(vδ) ≥ ε. Then, fj(w) 6= 0. Let βδ = w − vδ, we have that |βδ| ≤ δ and βδ ≥ 0
because of the claim and therefore βδ can be the valuation vector of an agent. Also let B = maxj(βδ)j and
zδ = βδ + δej where ej is the unit vector to the direction j.
Now let α = 1− εfj(w) . Then, because of the discontinuity, we have that fj(w)−fj(vδ) ≥ ε. Therefore.
fj(vδ)
fj(w)
≤ α (12)
where α is independent of δ. We let now
k = min
j:(zδ)j>0
{⌊
wj
(zδ)j
⌋}
and γj = wj − k · (zδ)j
We consider the following partition of w: p = {zδ, . . . ,zδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
,γ}. So, we have k agents with valuation zδ.
Next, we observe that any of these k agents can significantly (and profitably) change the probability
distribution of f by a slight deviation from her true valuation. Therefore, any truthful extension F of f must
verify each of these k agents with a probability at least ζ , due to truthfulness, where ζ is a constant that does
not depend on k and δ. Therefore, the expected verification of F is at least linear in the number of agents.
Specifically, let us assume that one of these k agents i has true valuation δej , where ej is the unit vector
with a single 1 in its j-th coordinate. Then, she prefers f(w) to f(vδ). So, if in this instance, the mechanism
F does not verify her, she will misreport zδ instead of δej to get f(w). So, for each agent i, we let
vri = Pr[F verifies i when reported valuations are as in p ]
Then, if the true valuation of the agent i is δej and she reports zδ, while all other agents report truthfully,
the utility of i is at least δ · (1− vri) · fj(w). For this lower bound on i’s utility, we assume that if F verifies
i, agent i gets utility 0. On the other hand, if agent i reports her true valuation δej , she gets utility δfj(vδ).
But since F is truthful, we have that
δ · (1− vri) · fj(w) ≤ δ · fj(vδ)⇒ (1− vri) ≤ fj(vδ)
fj(w)
(12)⇒ (1− vri) ≤ α⇒ 1− α ≤ vri
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Since α < 1, by definition, we let ζ = 1 − α. Hence, vri ≥ ζ and ζ is a positive constant that does not
depend on δ. Therefore the expected verification of F is
EVer(F ) =
∑
i
vri ≥ k · ζ = Ω(n) = Ω(1/δ)
We note that this holds for any δ > 0 and that the number of agents n can be arbitrary large.
Next, we consider the case where fj(vδ) − fj(w) ≥ ε. We define βδ, B as before. Also, we let L =
‖f(w)‖∞ and zδ = (2/ε)mLBej . The intuition and the basic steps of the proof are very similar to those
of the proof above. However, the technical details are different, we present the detailed argument below.
We assume, for simplicity, that fj(w) > 0 and let α = 1 + εfj(w) (we also derive below a similar lower
bound on the verification probability for the case where fj(w) = 0). Then, because of the discontinuity of
f , we have that fj(vδ)− fj(w) ≥ ε. Therefore,
fj(vδ)
fj(w)
≥ α , (13)
where α is independent of δ. Now, we let
k =
⌊
(vδ)j
(zδ)j
⌋
≥
⌊
wj − δ
(2/ε)mLB
⌋
= Ω(1/δ)
For the last equality, we use that ε,m,L,B are independent of δ. We also let γj = (vδ)j − k(zδ)j . Then,
we consider the following partition of vδ: p = {zδ, . . . ,zδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
,γ}. So, we have k agents with valuation zδ.
Let us assume that one of these agents i has true valuation βδ + (2/ε)mLBej . Then, i prefers f(w) to
f(vδ) because the j-th coordinate of her valuation dominates the others. So, if in this instance, the mecha-
nism F does not verify her, agent i would report zδ, instead of βδ+(2/ε)mLBej , in order to get f(w). So,
using our definition of the verification probability vri, if the true valuation of the agent i isβδ+(2/ε)mLBej
and all other agents report truthfully, the utility of agent i is at least (2/ε)mLB · (1 − vri) · fj(vδ). For
this lower bound on i’s utility, we assume that if F verifies i, agent i gets utility 0. If the agent i reports
truthfully, she gets utility∑
l
(βδ)lfl(w) + (2/ε)mLBfj(w) ≤ mLB + (2/ε)mLBfj(w) ,
where the inequality follows from the definition of B and L. But since F is truthful, we have that
(2/ε)mLB · (1− vri) · fj(vδ) ≤ mLB + (2/ε)mLBfj(w)⇒
⇒ 2
ε
· (1− vri) · fj(vδ) ≤ 1 + 2
ε
· fj(w) (13)⇒ 2
ε
· (1− vri)α ≤ 1
fj(w)
+
2
ε
⇒
⇒ 2
ε
· (α− 1)− 1
fj(w)
≤ α vri ⇒ 2
ε
· ε
fj(w)
− 1
fj(w)
≤ α vri ⇒ 1
fj(w) + ε
≤ vri
The last implications follow from calculations that use the definition of α. We let ζ = 1/(fj(w) + ε).
Thus, vri ≥ ζ and ζ is a positive constant that does not depend on δ.
In case where fj(w) = 0, the truthfulness condition becomes
(1− vri)(2ε)mLBfj(vδ) ≤ mLB ⇒ (1− vri)(2/ε)fj(vδ) ≤ 1⇒ vri ≥ 1/2
The last implication above follows from the fact that fj(vδ) − fj(w) ≥ ε⇒ fj(vδ) ≥ ε. So, in this case,
we let ζ = 1/2. As before, the expected verification of F is
EVer(F ) =
∑
i
vri ≥ k · ζ = Ω(n) = Ω(1/δ)
Note that this holds for any δ and that the number of agents n can be arbitrary large. ⊓⊔
24
A.13 Continuity Implies Participation
In this section, we show that participation is a necessary condition for any continuous scale invariant and
strongly anonymous full allocation rule f that can be extended to a truthful mechanism F with selective
verification. By Lemma 7.1, this also holds for any scale invariant and strongly anonymous full allocation
rule f that can be extended to a truthful mechanism F with selective verification of o(n) agents.
Lemma A.3. Let f be any continuous scale invariant and strongly anonymous full allocation rule. If f has
a truthful extension F , then f satisfies participation.
Proof. We first show that if any agent i declares valuation 0 for all outcomes, the probability distribution of
the truthful extension F of f is not affected by whether 0 is the true valuation of i or a misreport. To this
end, we fix the valuation profile x−i of all other agents and let w−i be the outcome weight vector induced
by x−i. We next show that for any agent i,
F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)) = F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) (14)
Let us assume that F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)) 6= F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)). Then, since f achieves full allocation,
|F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1))| = 1 and |F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0))| = 1. Therefore, there is an outcome j such that
Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) > Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)). Let γ ≡ Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) − Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 1))
be the difference in the probability of outcome j in F when 0 is a misreport of agent i and when agent i
truthfully declares 0.
Let ej be the unit vector with a single 1 in its j-th coordinate. Since F is an extension of f and since f is
strongly anonymous, (i) F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)) = f(w−i) ; and (ii) for any h > 0, F ((x−i, hej), (1−i, 1)) =
f(w−i + hej). Since f is continuous,
lim
h→0
f(w−i + hej) = f(w−i) = F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1))
Intuitively, the continuity of f implies that Fj((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) ≈ Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)), if δ is
small enough. Moreover, truthfulness implies that Fj((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) ≥ Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)). But
these contradict our assumption that Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) > Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)). Thus, we obtain (14).
Let us now formalize the intuition above. By continuity, there are an ǫ ∈ (0, γ) and a δ > 0 such that
|f(w−i + δej)− f(w−i)| ≤ ǫ⇒ |F ((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1))− F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1))| ≤ ǫ
This implies that |Fj((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) − Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 1))| ≤ ǫ < γ. Therefore, by the definition
of γ, we obtain that
Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) > Fj((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) (15)
Applying truthfulness when agent i has true valuation δej , we obtain that
δej · F ((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) ≥ δej · F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0))
Since δ > 0, we get that Fj((x−i, δej), (1−i, 1)) ≥ Fj((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)) which contradicts (15). So, we
obtain that (14) holds for any agent i.
Since F is an extension of f and since f is strongly anonymous, F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 1)) = f(w−i)
and F ((x−i,xi), (1−i, 1)) = f(w−i + xi), for the valuation xi of agent i. Using (14), we obtain that
f(w−i) = F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0)). Now, using truthfulness, we conclude that:
xi · F ((x−i,xi), (1−i, 1)) ≥ xi · F ((x−i,0), (1−i, 0))⇒ xi · f(w−i + xi) ≥ xi · f(w−i)
Therefore, f satisfies participation (and thus, F also satisfies participation, since F is an extension of f ). ⊓⊔
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A.14 Participation implies Discontinuity
Next, we use Lemma 2.2 and prove that if a full allocation rule f is strongly anonymous and scale invariant
and satisfies participation, then f is either constant (i.e., its allocation is independent of the reported val-
uations) or has a discontinuity at 1. The intuition is that by Lemma 2.2, any continuous allocation rule f
with these properties must satisfy f(w) = argmaxz∈∆(O)w · z. But, welfare maximizers over ∆(O), i.e.,
with full allocation, cannot be continuous (e.g., let m = 2 and consider welfare maximization over the unit
simplex for weights vectors (1, 1 + ǫ) and (1, 1 − ǫ)). The proof of the following formalizes this intuition.
Lemma A.4. Let f be any strongly anonymous and scale invariant full allocation rule that satisfies partic-
ipation. Then, the probability distribution of f is either constant or discontinuous.
Proof. Let f be a strongly anonymous and scale invariant full allocation rule that satisfies participation and
is not constant. To reach a contradiction, we assume that f is also continuous. Then, by Lemma 2.2, the
allocation of f can be regarded as the solution to an optimization problem where the feasible region is given
by a set Z and the direction of the objective is given by the input w to f . Thus f depends only on the
direction of w, which is expected, due to scale invariance. Since the allocation of f satisfies
∑
j fj(w) = 1,
f is a solution to an optimization problem on the hyperplane p1 :
∑
j fj = 1 with the feasible region
given by Z and the direction of the objective is given by the projection of w to the hyperplane p1. We
observe that any vector w can be written as w = wp1 +wn1 , where wp1 is the projection of w to p1 and
wn1 is the projection of w to a direction perpendicular to p1, which is the direction of n1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Therefore, since the optimization problem which determines the value of f is an optimization problem on
the p1, the allocation of f on input w depends only on the direction of wp1 . Hence, for any a, b > 0 if
w′ = awp1 + bwn1 , then f(w) = f(w′) 5.
Now since f is not constant, there exist two points w,v ∈ Rm+ such that f(w) 6= f(v). From the
discussion above, we have that w = wp1 + wn1 and that v = vp1 + vn1 . We next show that f is left
discontinuous at the point wn1 +vn1 . We take the point w′ = awp1 +wn1 , with a > 0 to be chosen so that
w′ < wn1 + vn1 , which means awp1 < vn1 . This is always possible because vn1 has the form (r, r, . . . , r)
and we can assume wlog. that r > 0, since f(v) depends only on vp1 . Similarly, we define v′ = bvp1 +vn1 ,
with b > 0 such that v′ < wn1 + vn1 . From the discussion above, we have that f(w′) = f(w) and that
f(v′) = f(v). We now define wǫ = ǫw′ + (1− ǫ)(wn1 + vn1). It is not hard to see that wǫ < wn1 + vn1
and that lim
ǫ→0
wǫ = wn1 + vn1 . Moreover,
wǫ = ǫwp1 +wn1 + (1− ǫ)vn1 = ǫwp1 + cwn1
for some c > 0. Therefore, f(wǫ) = f(w′) = f(w). In the same way, we define vδ = δv′+(1− δ)(wn1 +
vn1). Then, we have that vδ < wn1 + vn1 , that lim
δ→0
vδ = wn1 + vn1 , and that f(vδ) = f(v′) = f(v).
Therefore,
lim
ǫ→0
f(wǫ) = f(w) 6= f(v) = lim
δ→0
f(vδ)
Hence, the limit lim
y→(wn1+vn1 )
−
f(y) does not exist and f is left discontinuous at wn1 + vn1 . In fact, since
f is scale invariant, it is discontinuous at (1, 1, . . . , 1) = x∗ = (wn1 + vn1)/ |wn1 + vn1 |. ⊓⊔
A.15 The Analysis of Partial Power
In this section, we prove the main properties of the Partial Power allocation rule. Since Partial Power is a
strongly anonymous allocation rule, we restrict our attention to the weight vector w ≡ w(x) =∑ni=1 xi of
5 Formally, this follows from the description of f as an MIDR allocation rule that satisfies f(w) = argmaxz∈Z w · z, by
Lemma 2.2, and from the scale invariance of f .
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the outcomes, instead of the valuation profile x. For some fixed integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, we let f(w) denote the
allocation rule:
f (ℓ,r)(w) =
(1− 1/r)
m1/(ℓ+1)
· w
ℓ
‖wℓ‖1+1/ℓ
Interestingly, the Partial Power allocation rule bears a resemblance to proper scoring rules in [16]. For
simplicity of notation, whenever we use ‖v‖, without an index denoting the order of the norm, we refer to
the (ℓ+ 1)/ℓ-th norm ‖v‖1+1/ℓ of vector v.
Lemma A.5. For all integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, the allocation rule f (ℓ,r)(w) is the solution to the optimization
problem maxz∈Zℓ,r w · z, where
Zℓ,r =
{
z ∈ Rm≥0 : ‖z‖1+1/ℓ ≤ (1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1)
}
Proof. The range Zℓ,r is smooth and strictly convex. Therefore, the solution to the optimization problem
maxz∈Zℓ,r w · z is the extreme point p ∈ Zℓ,r in the direction of w. This point p satisfies ∇‖p‖ = λw
for some λ ∈ R which may depend on w. Moreover, we observe that ∇‖p‖ = (1 + 1/ℓ)p1/ℓ/‖p‖. Hence,
since p is the extreme point of Zℓ,r in the direction of w, we have that p = λwℓ. Also, since p is a point on
the boundary of Zℓ,r, ‖p‖ = (1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1), which gives the desired closed form for f (ℓ,r)(w). ⊓⊔
Lemma A.5 and Lemma 2.1 imply that the Partial Power allocation rule is MIDR and satisfies partici-
pation. The following provides an upper bound on the approximation ratio of Partial Power. The intuition
behind the approximation ratio is that due to the definition of the range Zℓ,r, the worst case for Partial Power
happens when w has a single 1 and all other components 0. Then, the maximum social welfare is 1, while
the expected social welfare of the partial allocation achieved by partial power is 1−1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
.
Lemma A.6. For all integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, the allocation rule f (ℓ,r)(w) achieves an approximation ratio of
(1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1) for the social welfare.
Proof. First, we recall that we use ‖w‖ to denote the (ℓ+1)/ℓ-th norm ‖w‖1+1/ℓ of vector w. The optimal
social welfare is maxj∈O wj = ‖w‖∞. Thus, the approximation ratio of f (ℓ,r)(w) is
w · f (ℓ,r)(w)
‖w‖∞ =
(1− 1/r)w ·wℓ
m1/(ℓ+1) ‖w‖∞‖wℓ‖
We observe that w ·wℓ =∑j∈O wℓ+1j = ‖wℓ‖(ℓ+1)/ℓ . Therefore,
w · f (ℓ,r)(w)
‖w‖∞ =
(1− 1/r) ‖wℓ‖1/ℓ
m1/(ℓ+1) ‖w‖∞
Now, we observe that for every ℓ ≥ 1,
‖wℓ‖1/ℓ =

∑
j∈O
(
wℓj
) ℓ+1
ℓ


ℓ
ℓ+1
· 1
ℓ
=

∑
j∈O
wℓ+1j

ℓ+1 = ‖w‖ℓ+1 ≥ ‖w‖∞
Therefore the approximation ratio of Partial Power is (1− 1/r)m−1/(ℓ+1) . ⊓⊔
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A.16 The Implementation of Partial Power by Mechanism 2
The analysis in Section A.15 focuses on the properties of the Partial Power allocation rule. In this sec-
tion, we establish that the implementation of Partial Power by Mechanism 2 with selective verification is
robust. Throughout this section, we fix a valuation profile x and a verification vector s. We always write
PartPowℓ,r, instead of PartPowℓ,r(x, s), for simplicity. Moreover, we let w ≡ w(x) = ∑ni=1 xi denote
the outcome weight vector induced by x.
In the next three lemmas, we establish the feasibility of PartPowℓ,r, for any integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, by
showing that whenever PartPowℓ,r results in ⊥, we can allocate a probability pj each to outcome j so that
PartPowℓ,r is robust. We recall that the probability pj of each outcome j ∈ O is:
pj =
f
(ℓ,r)
j (wT )− Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]Pr[PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = ⊥] , (16)
where T is the set of truthful agents in x. Note that for each outcome j, the probability pj is defined so that
when the truthful players have weight wT , the unconditional probability of outcome j in PartPowℓ,r is
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]Pr[PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥] + pj Pr[PartPowℓ,r = ⊥] = f (ℓ,r)j (wT )
Therefore, with these probabilities pj in the action ⊥, PartPowℓ,r becomes robust.
To establish that these probabilities are indeed feasible, we show that for all outcomes j, pj ≥ 0, and
that
∑
j∈O pj ≤ 1. The non-negativity of pj’s follows rather easily from the fact that excluding some
misreporting agents from PartPowℓ,r can only increase the probability that PartPowℓ,r results in outcome
j (see also Lemma A.7). The upper bound on ∑j∈O pj is more difficult to establish. The intuition is that
the additional verification in steps 1-4 of PartPowℓ,r makes the probability that some misreporting agent
is caught large enough. Then, the required “corrections” in the unconditional probability distribution of
PartPowℓ,r, which are implemented by the probabilities pj , should not be large. Hence, the sum of pj’s can
be upper bounded by 1 (see also Lemma A.9).
To simplify the notation, we let ⊥1 denote the case where PartPowℓ,r results in ⊥ at step 4, and ⊥2 for
the case where PartPowℓ,r results in ⊥ at step 9. Using this notation, we note that the probability of not
revealing any liars in steps 1-4 is
Pr
[
PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥1
]
=


∣∣∣wℓ+1T ∣∣∣
|wℓ+1|


r
Moreover, for the steps 5-10 of PartPowℓ,r, we have that the probability of outcome j is:
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥1] = 1− 1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
· (wT (j))
ℓ
‖wℓ‖1+1/ℓ
,
because outcome j is selected if and only if the term selected in step 6 contains only truthful agents.
Using these properties, we can show that pj ≥ 0. This is an immediate consequence of the following.
Lemma A.7. For all integers ℓ, r ≥ 1 and all outcomes j,
f
(ℓ,r)
j (wT ) ≥ Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]Pr[PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]
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Proof. We observe that the following holds for the probability on the rhs:
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥]Pr[PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥] ≤ Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥1]
=
1− 1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
· (wT (j))
ℓ
‖wℓ‖1+1/ℓ
≤ 1− 1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
· (wT (j))
ℓ
‖wℓT ‖1+1/ℓ
= f
(ℓ,r)
j (wT )
⊓⊔
To establish that
∑
j pj ≤ 1, we need the following technical lemma, which holds for all integers
ℓ, r ≥ 1. In the following lemma and in its proof, we use f(w), instead of f (ℓ,r)(w), and ‖v‖, instead of
‖v‖1+1/ℓ, for simplicity.
Lemma A.8. For all vectors v,w ∈ Rm≥0
|f(w)| − |f(w + v)| ≤ 1−
∣∣wℓ+1∣∣
|(w + v)ℓ+1|
Proof. Using the definition of the Partial Power allocation f(w), we obtain that:
|f(w)| − |f(w + v)| = 1− 1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
( ∣∣wℓ∣∣
‖wℓ‖ −
∣∣(w + v)ℓ∣∣
‖(w + v)ℓ‖
)
=
1− 1/r
m1/(ℓ+1)
·
∣∣wℓ∣∣
‖wℓ‖
(
1− ‖w
ℓ‖
|wℓ|
∣∣(w + v)ℓ∣∣
‖(w + v)ℓ‖
)
Since
∣∣wℓ∣∣ ≤ m1/(ℓ+1)‖wℓ‖ and ∣∣(w + v)ℓ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣wℓ∣∣, we obtain that
|f(w)| − |f(w + v)| ≤ (1− 1/r)
(
1− ‖w
ℓ‖
‖ (w + v)ℓ ‖
)
≤ (1− 1/r)
(
1− ‖w
ℓ‖ ℓ+1ℓ
‖ (w + v)ℓ ‖ ℓ+1ℓ
)
≤ 1−
∣∣wℓ+1∣∣
|(w + v)ℓ+1|
For the last inequality, we use that for the (ℓ+ 1)/ℓ-th norm, ‖wℓ‖(ℓ+1)/ℓ = ∣∣wℓ+1∣∣. ⊓⊔
We next show that
∑
j∈O pj ≤ 1, which implies the feasibility of the implementation of Partial Power
by Mechanism 2. In fact,
∑
j∈O pj ≤ 1 is an immediate consequence of the following. In the statement of
the lemma and in its proof, we use f(w), instead of f (ℓ,r)(w), and ‖v‖, instead of ‖v‖1+1/ℓ, for simplicity.
Also, we recall that since we regard the probability distribution of the allocation rule f as a vector over
outcomes, |f(w)| =∑j∈O fj(w) is the probability that f results in some outcome in O.
Lemma A.9. For all integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, the following holds:
∑
j∈O
(
fj(wT )− Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j]
)
≤ Pr[PartPowℓ,r = ⊥]
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Mechanism 5 The Exponential Mechanism Expoα(x, s)
Let N be the set of the remaining agents and let L← ∅
pick an outcome j ∈ O, an integer ℓ ≥ 0 and a tuple t ∈ N ℓ
with probability proportional to the value of the term xt1(j)xt2(j) · · · xtℓ(j)/(αℓℓ!)
for each agent i ∈ t do
if ver(i) 6= 1 then L← L ∪ {i}
if L 6= ∅ then return Expoα(x−L, s−L)
else return outcome j
Proof. For brevity, we let ρ = |w
ℓ+1
T |
|wℓ+1| throughout the proof. The desired inequality can be rewritten as:
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = ⊥] +
∑
j∈O
Pr[PartPowℓ,r = j] ≥ |f(wT )|
We observe that the lhs of the inequality above is 1− Pr[PartPowℓ,r = null], which is equal to:
1− Pr[PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥1]Pr
[
PartPowℓ,r(x, s) = null |PartPowℓ,r 6= ⊥1
]
= 1− ρr · (1− |f(w)|)
Therefore, it suffices to show that 1− ρr · (1− |f(w)|)− |f(wT )| ≥ 0.
We observe that Lemma A.8 implies that |f(w)| ≥ |f(wT )| − (1− ρ). Hence, it suffices to show that:
1− ρr · (1− |f(wT )| − (1− ρ))− |f(wT )| ≥ 0⇔
(1− ρr) · (1− |f(wT )|)− ρr(1− ρ) ≥ 0
Since |f(wT )| ≤ 1− 1/r, we obtain that
1− ρr
r
− ρr(1− ρ) ≥ 0⇔ 1− ρ
r
1− ρ − rρ
r ≥ 0⇔
r−1∑
k=0
ρk − rρr ≥ 0
The latter inequality is always true because ρk ≥ ρr, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ r, since ρ ∈ [0, 1]. ⊓⊔
We have shown that for all integers ℓ, r ≥ 1, PartPowℓ,r is robust. Since the Partial Power allocation
satisfies the participation constraint, Lemma 3.2 implies that PartPowℓ,r is truthful. To complete the proof
of Theorem 8.1, we set ℓ = O(lnm/ε) and r = O(1/ε) and get the desired approximation guarantee.
A.17 The Approximation Guarantee of Exponential
As for the approximation guarantee of Exponential, we let j be the outcome of maximum total weight and
let OPT = wj = ‖w‖∞ be j’s weight (and the optimal social welfare). We recall that the Exponential
allocation rule with parameter α > 0 is the solution to the following optimization problem
p∗ = arg max
p∈∆(O)
∑
i∈N
xi · p+ αH(p) ,
where H(p) = −∑j pj ln pj is the informational entropy of p (see e.g., [18]). So, we let p∗ be the proba-
bility distribution of Expoα and let ej be the unit vector with a single 1 in coordinate j. Then,
OPT =
∑
i∈N
xi · ej + αH(ej) ≤
∑
i∈N
xi · p∗ + αH(p∗) ≤
∑
i∈N
xi · p∗ + α lnm
The first inequality follows from the definition of p∗ and the second inequality holds because the maximum
entropy of any distribution in ∆(O) is lnm. Therefore, the expected welfare of Expoα is
∑
i∈N xi · p∗ ≥
OPT − α lnm. ⊓⊔
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